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The Steepness of the Slippery Slope:   
Second Amendment Litigation in the Lower Federal 
Courts and What It Has to Do with Background 
Recordkeeping Legislation 
MICHAEL P. O’SHEA 
Proposals for federal gun control have recently focused on 
expanding background checks and recordkeeping requirements for 
private firearms transfers.  This Article places the debate about such 
legislation in a fuller context that includes the actions of the executive 
and judicial branches, as well as current gun control efforts in the 
states.  This enables a more informed appraisal of the anti-slippery 
slope arguments that motivate opposition to such laws.  I examine 
mechanisms that can make descending the slippery slope more or less 
likely, focusing on judicial enforcement of the Second Amendment right 
to arms in the federal courts.  A study of 225 lower federal court 
Second Amendment decisions from June 2008 to October 2013 reveals 
that, since District of Columbia v. Heller, most courts have taken a 
highly deferential approach to legislation, and Second Amendment 
limits on government action have been imposed—all but exclusively—
by judges appointed by Republican presidents.  
The Article closes by considering possible bases for legislative 
compromise.  Future proposals for expanded background checks 
should: (1) structure the check to minimize recordable information 
about transfers, and (2) remedy the lower courts’ clearest shortfall in 
enforcing the post-Heller Second Amendment by mandating nationwide 
handgun carry permit reciprocity.
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The Steepness of the Slippery Slope: 
Second Amendment Litigation in the Lower Federal 
Courts and What It Has to Do with Background 
Recordkeeping Legislation 
MICHAEL P. O’SHEA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Senate’s rejection in April 2013 of the so-called 
Manchin-Toomey Amendment, a gun control measure that would have 
extended federal background checks and recordkeeping requirements to 
most private transfers of firearms,1 prompted relief in some quarters2 and 
anger in others—including the Oval Office.3  Manchin-Toomey was part of 
a slate of proposed gun control measures in the Senate that also included 
bans on the sale of dozens of popular models of self-loading rifles4 and of 
                                                                                                                
* Professor of Law and Associate Director of the Center for the Study of State Constitutional Law 
and Government, Oklahoma City University.  J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001; M.A., University of 
Pittsburgh, 1998; B.A., Harvard College, 1995.  Professor O’Shea is co-author of the first law school 
textbook on firearms law and the constitutional right to keep and bear arms, Firearms Law and the 
Second Amendment: Regulation, Rights, and Policy.  He thanks George Mocsary for valuable feedback 
on an earlier version of this Article.  Timothy Gatton of the Oklahoma City University Law Library, as 
well as Anna Cantu, Kyle Dominick, and Shannon Payne Pearson, provided excellent research 
assistance. 
1 Public Safety and Second Amendment Rights Protection Act of 2013, S. Amend. 715 to S. 649, 
113th Cong. § 122 (2013).  The amendment was nicknamed for its lead sponsor, Democratic Senator 
Joe Manchin of West Virginia, and its co-sponsor, Republican Senator Patrick Toomey of 
Pennsylvania.  Jeff Zeleny, Senators Crack Impasse on Gun Background Check, ABC NEWS BLOG 
(Apr. 10, 2013, 1:12 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/04/senators-crack-impasse-on-
gun-background-check/.  The amendment’s other sponsors were Democratic Senator Charles Schumer 
of New York and Republican Senator Mark Kirk of Illinois.  Id. 
2 See Chris Cillizza & Sean Sullivan, Why the American Public Isn’t Mad as Hell About the 
Failure of the Gun Bill (in Numbers), WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2013, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/04/24/why-the-american-public-isnt-mad-as-
hell-about-the-failure-of-the-gun-bill-in-numbers/ (“39 percent call themselves ‘relieved’ or ‘happy’ 
about [the defeat of Manchin-Toomey].”). 
3 See EMILY MILLER, EMILY GETS HER GUN BUT OBAMA WANTS TO TAKE YOURS 112 (2013) 
(“After the Senate votes, the president was enraged.”); Ed O’Keefe & Philip Rucker, Senate Rejects 
Curbs on Guns, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2013, at A1 (describing the President as “visibly angry” while 
remarking to the press that Manchin-Toomey’s rejection was “a pretty shameful day for Washington”). 
4 S. Amend. 711 to S. 649, 113th Cong. § 402 (2013); see Press Release, Dianne Feinstein, U.S. 
Senator, Feinstein Introduces Bill on Assault Weapons, High-Capacity Magazines (Jan. 24, 2013), 
available at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=5dffbf07-d8e5-42aa-
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common types of magazines holding more than ten rounds of ammunition.5 
In the end, none of the gun control proposals obtained enough votes to 
proceed from the Senate.6  Some failed to obtain support from even a bare 
majority of Senators.7  In one case—the proposed ban on modern self-
loading rifles—the proposed measure was rejected by a supermajority 
margin.8  
The rejection of the background check recordkeeping provisions drew 
particular criticism, with some claiming that legislators who opposed the 
measure “are merely obstructionists . . . who will not agree to common-
sense gun legislation.”9  Such controversy is likely to be revived before 
Congress in the future.10 
This Article attempts to inform the debate about congressional 
background recordkeeping legislation by placing it in a broader context 
that includes recent actions of the judicial and executive branches of the 
federal government, as well as restrictive gun legislation recently enacted 
at the state level.  This fuller context suggests that the rejection of 
expanded federal recordkeeping legislation was a reasonable response to 
genuine threats to the constitutional right to keep and bear arms.  
Constitutional and legislative protections for gun rights are mechanisms 
that could, in some situations, reduce such threats and pave the way to 
regulatory compromise.  But the burden of this Article is to argue that 
those mechanisms are not functioning properly today.  Under those 
conditions, the rejection of Manchin-Toomey was consistent with a 
                                                                                                                
9f22-0743368dd754 (“[T]he bill prohibits the sale, manufacture, transfer, and importation of 157 of the 
most-commonly-owned military-style assault weapons.”). 
5 S. Amend. 714 to S. 649, 113th Cong. § 402 (2013).  This proposed amendment was introduced 
by Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut for Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey.  Id. 
6 The Manchin-Toomey background recordkeeping measure obtained fifty-four votes, but fell 
short of the sixty-vote hurdle the Senate had set for amendments to the underlying bill, the Safe 
Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013.  U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 1st Session, 
SENATE.GOV (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.
cfm?congress=113&session=1&vote=00097.  The Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act, which was 
introduced by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada, contained a more prohibitive set of 
regulations for private firearms transfers.  S. 2584, 113th Cong. (2013). 
7 The proposed magazine ban, S. Amend. 714 to S. 649, was defeated by a vote of forty-six to 
fifty-four.  U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 113th Congress – 1st Session, SENATE.GOV (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1
&vote=00103. 
8 Senator Feinstein’s proposed ban on the AR-15 and dozens of other popular self-loading rifles, 
S. Amend. 711 to S. 649, was defeated by a vote of forty to sixty.  U.S. Senate Roll Call                    
Votes 113th Congress – 1st Session, SENATE.GOV (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=113&session=1
&vote=00101. 
9 Robert A. Levy, Op-Ed., A Libertarian Case for Expanding Gun Background Checks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/27/opinion/a-libertarian-case-for-
resurrecting-the-manchin-toomey-compromise.html?_r=0. 
10 See MILLER, supra note 3, at 112 (quoting Senator Reid’s pledge that “this debate is not over”). 
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skeptical and defensive orientation toward potential threats to Second 
Amendment values—an orientation that legislators, in turn, were justified 
in adopting. 
The objections voiced to proposed laws like Manchin-Toomey often 
include concerns about privacy and the related fear that official 
information about firearms ownership will not be kept secure.  Indeed, 
these worries appear more plausible in light of recent abuses of 
government firearms databases.  For example, in a high-profile incident 
last year, Missouri Highway Patrol officials responded to an oral request 
from a single U.S. Social Security Administration investigator by mailing 
him the personal information of over 163,000 Missouri concealed carry 
permit holders.11 
But a further, and perhaps more fundamental objection to this type of 
legislation takes the form of a slippery slope argument,12 which is the focus 
of this Article.  Many opponents of background check recordkeeping laws 
agree that certain categories of people (e.g., convicted felons, the insane, 
drug addicts) are properly excluded from the right to gun ownership.13  
Federal law already mandates background checks for retail purchases of 
firearms.14  Some would agree that expanding checks to private sales 
would prevent some transfers of firearms to prohibited persons.15  The 
slippery slope objection, then, does not focus upon the immediate 
operation of expanded background check laws; rather, it rests on the fear 
                                                                                                                
11 David A. Lieb, Mo. Patrol Gave Feds List of Concealed Gun Holders, KAN. CITY                   
STAR (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.kansascity.com/2013/04/12/4177167/mo-patrol-gave-feds-list-of-
concealed.html.  Federal officials originally stated that they were able to read the information on the 
discs, but then reversed the statement and reported that they were unreadable.  The head of Missouri’s 
Department of Revenue, the state agency that compiled the carry permit information, resigned shortly 
after the information disclosure became public.  Jonathan Shorman, Department of Revenue Director 
Resigns Amid Gun Permit Scrutiny, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Springfield, Mo.) (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://www.news-leader.com/article/20130415/NEWS01/304150098/After-saying-gun-permit-list-was-
read-federal-agency-reverses-itself. 
12 See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1029 
(2003) (defining a slippery slope as a situation “where one group’s support of a first step A eventually 
made it easier for others to implement a later step B that might not have happened without A”). 
13 See, e.g., Clayton E. Cramer, Background Checks and Murder Rates 2–3 (unpublished 
manuscript) (Apr. 11, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2249317 
(criticizing the empirical evidence that laws mandating background checks for private gun sales 
actually reduce homicides, but conceding that “the logic of such laws seems persuasive”).  The 
Supreme Court’s opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller extended at least presumptive approval to 
the constitutionality of laws prohibiting felons and the insane from owning firearms.  See 554 U.S. 570, 
626–27 (2008) (describing such laws as “longstanding” forms of regulation).  
14 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(1) (2012).  For a description of the process by which retailers must check 
and record information about gun purchasers, see infra Part II.B.   
15 See, e.g., Greg Sargent, Why Expanding Background Checks Would, in Fact, Reduce Gun 
Crime, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2013, 12:49 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/wp/20
13/04/03/why-expanding-background-checks-would-in-fact-reduce-gun-crime/ (noting that the ability 
to trace records of gun transfers would create a “disincentive” to sell to prohibited persons). 
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that expanding such laws will make it more likely that government 
officials will later enact or enforce additional restrictions that the 
opponents do regard as substantively unacceptable and/or 
unconstitutional.16  This Article documents features of the contemporary 
political and legal climate that make concerns about slippery slopes 
plausible in the area of gun policy. 
Part II of this Article summarizes current federal law governing 
background checks and recordkeeping and explains how Manchin-Toomey 
and similar measures would change it.  This Part also discusses the 
structure of slippery slope arguments in general and identifies some 
features that can make progression down a slippery slope more or less 
likely in particular circumstances. 
Part III considers the severity of the current political opposition to gun 
rights, as shown in the actions taken by state legislatures and the recent 
statements of prominent federal elected officials. 
Part IV shifts the focus to the judicial branch.  Some may argue that, 
whatever the merit of slippery slope objections to recordkeeping laws in 
the past, such fears are adequately addressed today by the ability of 
individuals to bring Second Amendment claims in federal court, with 
confidence that the courts will serve as a backstop to prevent legislative 
excesses.  That confidence, it turns out, is currently unjustified.  This Part 
documents the history of enforcement of the Second Amendment in the 
lower federal courts in the years since the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark 
decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.17  The litigation record displays 
a pattern of great deference to legislation—particularly on the part of 
judges nominated by Democratic presidents—that significantly weakens 
the argument that judicial enforcement of the Second Amendment can be 
relied upon to prevent gun restrictions from descending the slippery slope. 
Part V concludes by assessing the prospects for legislative compromise 
in the future.  Any expansion of federal regulation of firearm transfers will 
implicate to some degree the slippery-slope risks diagnosed in Parts II 
through IV.  Still, it is possible to describe a “best-case” proposal for 
expanded background checks that would reflect a strong effort to 
ameliorate slippery-slope risks.  The two most important features of the 
proposal are: (1) structuring the background-check requirement to generate 
as little recordable information as possible about particular firearm 
transfers; and (2) coupling new transfer regulations with legislative action 
                                                                                                                
16 See Joseph E. Olson & David B. Kopel, All the Way Down the Slippery Slope: Gun Prohibition 
in England and Some Lessons for Civil Liberties in America, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 399, 462–63 (1999) 
(concluding that “registration of the property of persons who exercised the right” to have arms in the 
United Kingdom was a factor that contributed to the right’s “destruction,” because it “later . . . 
facilitate[d] confiscation” of that property when Parliament enacted bans on various firearms). 
17 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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to remedy the lower federal courts’ clearest shortfall in enforcing the post-
Heller Second Amendment, by mandating nationwide handgun carry 
permit reciprocity.  
II.  SLIPPERY SLOPE SCENARIOS AND ANTI-SLIPPERY SLOPE PROTECTIONS 
A.  The Structure of the Slippery Slope Argument Against Gun Registration 
How strongly do “the mechanisms of the slippery slope”18 operate in 
the area of gun control today?  Eugene Volokh has usefully schematized 
the distinctive way that slippery slope dangers influence policy choice.  
Such dangers produce “situation[s] where a potentially valuable option A, 
which would pass if considered solely on its own merits, is defeated 
because of swing voters’ reasonable fears that [adopting] A will lead to 
B”—the adoption of a measure they view as unacceptable.19   
As the reference to “reasonable fears” in this definition acknowledges, 
slippery slopes sometimes materialize.20  It follows that some refusals to 
take the first step, A, may be reasonable even if one does not find A 
objectionable on its merits.  And the more likely it is that adopting a 
particular, otherwise acceptable step A will lead to a future unacceptable 
outcome B, the greater the “slippery slope inefficiency”21 that characterizes 
policy choice in this area.  Likewise, the more substantively unacceptable 
B is, the greater the slippery slope inefficiency, which provides an 
independent reason to reject policy A.  (The slippery slope inefficiency can 
be defined as the product of the net disutility of B multiplied by the 
likelihood that adopting A will lead to B.)  
Volokh repeatedly draws upon background check recordkeeping laws 
for firearm transfers as an example of a situation in which slippery slope 
inefficiencies may importantly affect policy choice.22  The slippery-slope 
risks raised by background check laws arise because such laws generate 
official records of firearms transactions.23  These typically record both the 
individuals involved in each transfer and the specific firearm being 
                                                                                                                
18 Volokh, supra note 12, at 1128. 
19 Id. at 1131. 
20 See Olson & Kopel, supra note 16, at 399–401 (documenting the progression of piecemeal gun 
control measures in the twentieth-century United Kingdom, beginning with modest and seemingly 
reasonable measures—and leading to a state at the turn-of-the millennium in which handgun ownership 
is illegal, many long guns are restricted, onerous storage and warrantless-search requirements are 
imposed on legal gun owners, and the use of firearms for self-defense is heavily stigmatized).  More 
examples from the subject of gun control are listed later in this Part. 
21 Volokh, supra note 12, at 1131. 
22 Id. at 1033–34, 1039–40, 1044–45. 
23 See 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (2012) (requiring licensed importers, manufacturers, and dealers to 
maintain records of sales or other dispositions of firearms). 
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transferred24—as Manchin-Toomey would have done for most private sales 
between individuals.25 
Therefore, such laws generate data that is similar to the type of data 
created by laws that directly mandate gun registration.  They thus raise the 
same slippery-slope risks as gun registration laws: namely, they enable 
future forms of gun confiscation that would not have been feasible prior to 
(official or de facto) registration.26  In Volokh’s terms, allowing the 
government to verify that each person acquiring a firearm is a legal 
purchaser (outcome A), which is presumed to be desirable or at least not 
harmful on its own merits, raises the risk that a future government will 
pursue broad gun bans and similar confiscatory measures (outcome B), 
which are made more practicable by the generation of data on firearms 
transactions that the passage of measure A enabled.27  
The slippery-slope risk associated with a background recordkeeping 
measure depends on several factors.  One is whether the existence of 
government records of firearms transactions makes confiscation practical 
in situations when it would otherwise not have been.28  If confiscation is 
expected to fail in practice, or to be very costly, then confiscatory measures 
are less likely to be enacted, even if there is a considerable political will in 
favor of gun confiscation.  But if a regime of criminally enforced 
recordkeeping requirements has reduced the practical difficulty of 
confiscation, then a political will in favor of such a choice is more likely to 
be translated into action.  Volokh calls this sort of mechanism a “cost-
lowering slippery slope.”29 
This factor is crucial in assessing the slippery slope risks of 
background checks.  Gun rights supporters often intuit that the current 
proposals to bring private sales within the federal recordkeeping system are 
more consequential than they seem at first; such laws touch core political 
realities in the conflict over guns.  But in the recent debate over Manchin-
Toomey, the pro-gun side did not always do a good job of articulating 
those fears in a cogent manner.  To appreciate the way that recordkeeping 
laws lower the practical cost of future restrictions, it will be useful to 
summarize current federal law governing background checks for gun 
transfers. 
                                                                                                                
24 Id. §§ 922(t), 923(g). 
25 S. Amend. 715 to S. 649, 113th Cong. § 122 (2013). 
26 Volokh, supra note 12, at 1033–34. 
27 See id. (setting forth factors that may influence the seriousness of the slippery-slope risk that 
registration will lead to confiscation). 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 1043. 
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B.  Current Federal Recordkeeping Laws 
Under the Gun Control Act of 1968,30 as amended, a federal firearms 
license is required in order to “engage in the business” of dealing in 
firearms for a living.31  The term “FFL” is commonly used to refer to such 
a license, as well as a business or individual who holds one.32  Purchases of 
firearms from an FFL, such as a retail gun store, are subject to an 
automated background check conducted by federal employees (a procedure 
that the retailer normally conducts by telephone while the customer 
waits).33  The FFL must record information from each purchase on the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) Form 
4473, including the name, address, and identifying characteristics of the 
purchaser, as well as the serial number and type of the firearm involved.34 
The terms of the Gun Control Act require the federal government to 
“destroy” the information it creates in responding to the telephone 
background check, except for a unique number designating the particular 
transaction.35  This requirement was meant to prevent the recordkeeping 
requirement from functioning as the equivalent of a national gun registry.  
Indeed, the text of the Act expressly prohibits federal and state 
                                                                                                                
30 The Gun Control Act of 1968 established a federal regulatory scheme for the transfer and 
possession of ordinary firearms such as handguns, rifles, and shotguns.  Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 
1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012)).  It has been amended a number of times since 
its enactment, most importantly in 1986 with the passage of the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, 
which, inter alia, provided that a culpable mens rea requirement applied to most federal firearms 
offenses and clarified when a person who engages in firearms sales should be deemed “engaged in the 
business” of dealing in firearms, thus triggering a federal license requirement.  Pub. L. No. 99-308, 
§ 101, 100 Stat. 449, 450 (1986).  In 1993, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act created a 
system of formal background checks required in order to purchase a firearm.  Pub. L. No. 103-159, 
§ 102, 107 Stat. 1536, 1539 (1993).  A version of the Brady Act’s background check requirement, the 
National Instant Check System (“NICS”), remains in effect today for retail purchases of firearms.  18 
U.S.C. § 922(t). 
31 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A).  The Act defines a person who is “engaged in the business” of 
dealing in firearms as: 
[A] person who devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular 
course of trade or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit 
through the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms, but such term shall not 
include a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms 
for the enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part 
of his personal collection of firearms. 
Id. § 921(a)(21)(C). 
32 How to Become a Federal Firearms Licensee (FFL), BUREAU ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS 
& EXPLOSIVES, http://www.atf.gov/firearms/how-to/become-an-ffl.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
33 National Instant Criminal Background Check System, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). 
34 27 C.F.R. § 478.124(a) (2013); see also BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & 
EXPLOSIVES, FIREARMS TRANSACTION RECORD PART I – OVER-THE-COUNTER (2012), available at 
http://www.atf.gov/files/forms/download/atf-f-4473-1.pdf (copy of the current Form 4473). 
35 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(2)(C). 
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governments from using the records generated by the instant background 
check system to maintain “any system of registration of firearms, firearm 
owners, or firearm transactions.”36 
Despite this prohibition on a “system of registration,” the Gun Control 
Act does, in fact, impose substantial recordkeeping requirements on 
firearms transfers within its scope.  The FFL is obligated to retain the Form 
4473 from each transaction for at least twenty years and must allow ATF 
agents to inspect the forms during annual regulatory compliance 
inspections.37  The ATF can also inspect the forms whenever needed for a 
bona fide law enforcement investigation.38  Under current law, the ATF 
may employ a “demand letter” to obtain records for an investigation; it 
need not send an agent to personally inspect them at the FFL’s place of 
business.39  Finally, and importantly, when an FFL leaves the firearms 
business and wraps up its operations, the formerly decentralized records 
become centralized: the FFL is required to transfer its inventory of Form 
4473s to the ATF, to be retained by that agency.40 
It is most fair to characterize the background check and recordkeeping 
provisions of the Gun Control Act today as a program, if not of overt 
registration, then of semi-registration applied to personal firearms whose 
owners acquired them through retail purchases.41  True, the 
decentralization of the records kept in the hands of FFLs does increase 
transaction costs on government action and thereby creates some obstacles 
to using them as a unified gun registry.  Nevertheless, the existence of 
detailed official records on each retail gun transaction and the fact that the 
                                                                                                                
36 Id. § 926(a).  The provision reads:  
No such rule or regulation prescribed after [May 19, 1986] may require that records 
required to be maintained under this chapter or any portion of the contents of such 
records, be recorded at or transferred to a facility owned, managed, or controlled by 
the United States or any State or any political subdivision thereof, nor that any 
system of registration of firearms, firearms owners, or firearms transactions or 
dispositions be established.  Nothing in this section expands or restricts the 
[Attorney General]’s authority to inquire into the disposition of any firearm in the 
course of a criminal investigation. 
Id. 
37 Id. § 923(g)(1)(B); 27 C.F.R. § 478.129(b). 
38 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(1)(B)(iii). 
39 See id. § 923(g)(5) (referencing the Attorney General’s ability to request records of sales by 
letter).  Though it makes most sense to interpret this provision consistently with the rest of the Gun 
Control Act as merely stipulating a particular manner in which FFLs may be asked to produce records 
to which ATF is otherwise entitled, some federal courts have interpreted the provision as a freestanding 
source of power to access records.  See infra Part IV.D. 
40 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(4); 27 C.F.R. § 478.127. 
41 Cf. Olson & Kopel, supra note 16, at 419 & n.86 (characterizing the current recordkeeping 
regime simply as “federal registration” of retail firearms purchases and the Form 4473 as a “registration 
form”). 
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federal government knows where all of the records are (and gradually 
absorbs them into its own custody as FFLs go out of business), raises some 
of the concerns about abuse of information that characterize gun 
registration programs generally.  
There is, however, an important limit on the scope of semi-registration 
under the Gun Control Act today.  If one takes a broader view and asks 
about all lawful personally owned firearms in America, then it becomes 
more apt to describe current federal law as falling well short of full gun 
registration.  That is because unlike retail sales, many private sales of 
firearms are not subject to a formal background check and recordkeeping 
requirements. 
Private sales are occasional sales of guns between individuals, when 
neither the buyer nor the seller holds an FFL or engages in the business of 
dealing in firearms for a living.42  Such sales take place at homes, at 
shooting club events, at gun shows, on Internet forums for firearm 
enthusiasts, and in other venues.43  They have always been legal under 
federal law as long as the buyer and seller are both citizens of the same 
state and neither is legally prohibited from possessing a firearm.44  
Moreover, such intrastate private sales have traditionally been exempt from 
the formal background check and recordkeeping requirements that govern 
retail purchases of guns from an FFL; the participants need not create or 
maintain a Form 4473.45  But it is still a crime for a non-FFL individual to 
sell a gun to another non-FFL individual if the seller knows or has reason 
to believe that the recipient is legally prohibited from possessing a 
firearm—for example, by having a prior felony conviction that disqualifies 
the buyer from firearms ownership.46  
C.  How Federal Recordkeeping for Private Sales Would Change the 
Slippery Slope Calculus 
Manchin-Toomey would have extended the semi-registration regime of 
the Gun Control Act to most privately transferred firearms.47  With a 
limited exception for transfers between family members, the bill proposed 
to extend the federal recordkeeping requirements for retail sales—and the 
associated felony penalties for noncompliance—to any private sale that 
took place at a gun show or “pursuant to an advertisement, posting, display 
or other listing on the Internet or in a publication by the transferor of his 
                                                                                                                
42 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), (5). 
43 NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: REGULATION, 
RIGHTS, AND POLICY 17–18 (2012). 
44 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(5), (d). 
45 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(t) (only imposing recordkeeping requirements on sales involving an FFL). 
46 See id. § 922(d) (listing categories of prohibited persons). 
47 S. Amend. 715 to S. 649, 113th Cong. § 122 (2013). 
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intent to transfer, or the transferee of his intent to acquire, the firearm.”48  
Any private sale covered by this broad definition would thenceforth have 
had to be conducted through a licensed FFL dealer as intermediary 
between the non-FFL buyer and non-FFL seller.  The FFL would have 
been required to create and maintain a Form 4473 documenting the details 
of the transaction and, in most cases, to conduct a centralized telephone 
background check on the buyer.49 
The Manchin-Toomey Amendment would have had a significant 
impact on the strategic politics of gun rights.  Professor Nicholas Johnson 
has explored the issue in a recent writing.50  Under federal law today, some 
significant fraction of the guns lawfully possessed in private hands cannot 
be traced by the government to their owners.  These are the guns that have 
been transferred in private sales exempt from the federal recordkeeping 
requirements.  Over the years, guns pass from their original retail 
purchaser (whom the government can readily trace via the federal Form 
4473 created by the purchase), through one or more unrecorded private 
sales to their current owners, whose identity is often impracticable to 
reconstruct.51  These “unpapered” guns are likely only a minority of the 
total gun supply.52  Yet because of the sheer number of privately owned 
                                                                                                                
48 Id. 
49 Id.  The measure contained a limited exception allowing transferees who held a valid state-
issued handgun carry permit to present it to the FFL in lieu of the federal instant background check, but 
did not exempt covered private transfers from the requirement that the FFL generate and retain a Form 
4473 documenting the details of the transaction.  Id. 
50 Nicholas J. Johnson, Gun Control Advocates Are Playing Chess, LIB. LIBERTY L. BLOG      
(Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2013/04/18/gun-control-advocates-are-playing-chess/ 
[hereinafter Johnson, Playing Chess].  Similar arguments are developed at greater length in Nicholas J. 
Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder Problem, 43 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 837 (2008). 
51 Of course, many private sellers will know the identity of the buyer to whom they sold a firearm 
in a private sale, and in some cases this will enable the government to continue to trace a firearm past 
its original retail purchaser.  But some private sellers will have forgotten the identity of the buyer with 
the passage of time, and this will prevent officials from tracking the firearm further.  Or the sellers may 
never have learned it. 
A simple procedure is sometimes used at gun shows and other locales to ensure the lawfulness of 
a private sale without disclosing the buyer’s identity.  The seller demands that the buyer display a 
current state-issued photo ID showing his or her picture, such as a driver’s license or handgun carry 
permit, but the seller does not view or notate the buyer’s name printed on the ID.  This procedure 
verifies that the buyer is a resident of the same state as the seller (as required by federal law); and in the 
case of the handgun carry permit, it also verifies that the buyer is lawfully entitled to possess firearms.  
But it does not produce any record of the transaction that would enable the government to trace the 
firearm to its current owner.  When one further considers that some firearms have passed through 
multiple lawful, but non-traceable, private sales of this type, it becomes evident how private sales 
function as a bulwark against the possibility of future gun confiscation.  See Johnson, Playing Chess, 
supra note 50 (explaining how “no paper” guns are a “barrier” against gun bans). 
52 One figure employed by federal officials in the recent debate estimates that 40% of firearms 
transactions are private sales not subject to federal recordkeeping requirements.  See Glenn Kessler, 
Obama’s Claim on Background Checks Based on Old Data, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2013, at A2.  This 
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firearms in America—over three hundred million guns by some 
estimates53—even a fraction of the total translates into many millions of 
unpapered guns.  This massive residuum means that governments cannot 
easily get all the guns, even if they are willing to violate the Constitution to 
do so.  It is a form of protection tailored to the most hardened realist, in 
that it does not depend on the good faith of officials to work.  Johnson 
explains: 
If you don’t know who has the guns, you can’t really get at 
them because our pesky fourth amendment would bar 
random or house to house searches. . . .  [E]ven if you passed 
sweeping gun bans, evidence from countries that have tried, 
shows that people who have guns that you don’t know about 
will just keep them, fueling a tremendous black market 
inventory that will make things worse.    
So it turns out that the inventory of unrecorded, “no paper” 
guns, is a far stronger barrier against sweeping gun bans than 
any pronouncement of the Supreme Court or other such 
parchment limits.  It is in fact a hard practical block that 
renders gun confiscation in America a pipe dream.  
. . . And while that scenario seems unlikely today, not so long 
ago, [confiscation] was the openly articulated agenda of 
many of the people and organizations in the vanguard of the 
current battle.  And that helps explain the “bewildering” 
opposition to universal background checks.  
Mandatory checks on all secondary sales, supplemented by 
some type of data recording [as in the Manchin-Toomey 
Amendment] . . . means that within the life span of those 
alive today, the inventory of “no paper guns” (which again 
forms the hard practical barrier against sweeping gun 
confiscation in America) would evaporate.  So the objection 
to universal background checks, which in isolation many find 
unobjectionable, is really rooted in a fear of gun registration.  
                                                                                                                
claim has been criticized: the 1997 report relied on for that statistic actually yielded a figure of 35.7% 
of firearms transactions involving an acquisition from someone other than an FFL.  PHILIP J. COOK & 
JENS LUDWIG, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, GUNS IN AMERICA: NATIONAL SURVEY ON PRIVATE 
OWNERSHIP AND USE OF FIREARMS 6 (1997), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf.  
This figure included guns received as gifts from friends or family members.  See Kessler, supra (“A 
reader expressed deep skepticism of this 40 percent figure when Obama used it. . . . [W]hen gifts, 
inheritances and prizes are added in, then the number shrinks to 26.4 percent.”).  But even if the true 
fraction of firearm transactions that are private sales is significantly less than forty percent, this would 
still yield tens of millions of lawfully owned firearms in private hands that are not tied to their current 
possessors by a federal Form 4473.  
53 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 453. 
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And the objection to registration is really an objection to the 
grand ambition of sweeping supply controls.54 
So the status quo, which exempts intrastate private sales of firearms 
from the federal recordkeeping requirements that govern retail sales, is not 
usefully characterized as a “gun show loophole,” or any kind of 
“loophole,” a term which tends to connote an arbitrary or inadvertent 
omission from prohibitory legislation.55  Rather, it is better viewed as 
reflecting an implicit substantive compromise on the scope of regulation.  
It balances, on one hand, the government’s interest in generating records to 
aid enforcement of the prohibition on transfers to prohibited persons 
against, on the other hand, the liberty interests in safeguarding against 
long-term risks of firearms confiscation, as well as allowing people to 
dispose of their lawful property without expensive or time-consuming 
regulatory requirements.  
The risks that recordkeeping laws will facilitate later confiscation have 
been borne out in practice.  In the United Kingdom, the government 
required handguns to be registered beginning in 1920.56  After decades of 
slowly increasing restrictions on registered owners, the British government 
banned handgun possession outright in the late 1990s.57  The registration 
records were used to confiscate previously lawful handguns from 
approximately 57,000 owners.58  The extensive twentieth-century gun 
registration laws in place in New York City likewise set the stage for 
legislation banning many types of formerly registrable semi-automatic 
rifles in 1991.59  
The harsh new gun laws adopted in the New York State contemplate a 
slow-moving confiscation of many common semi-automatic rifles.60  
                                                                                                                
54 Johnson, Playing Chess, supra note 50; see Volokh, supra note 12, at 1039–40 (outlining a 
progression of events similar to Johnson’s version as one form of the slippery slope risk associated with 
gun registration). 
55 Cf. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1028 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “loophole” as “[a]n ambiguity, 
omission, or exception (as in a law or other legal document) that provides a way to avoid a rule without 
violating its literal requirements”). 
56 Olson & Kopel, supra note 16, at 433. 
57 Id. at 432. 
58 See id. at 430 (noting that before the confiscation, approximately one-third of Great Britain’s 
173,000 Firearms Certificate holders were handgun owners); see also id. at 433 (“Since . . . all 
lawfully-owned handguns in Great Britain are registered with the government, . . . handgun owners 
have little choice but to surrender their guns . . . for payment . . . according to government schedule. . . . 
The British Parliament who created the gun registration system in 1920 had no intention of banning 
handguns.  But that 1920 Parliament failed to foresee the danger that a registration system, even if 
created with the best intentions, could later be used for confiscation.”).  
59 See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 10-303.1(d) (2014) (requiring registered gun owners in possession 
of “assault weapon[s]” to “peaceably surrender” their guns to law enforcement within ninety days of 
the ban or remove them from the City). 
60 See infra Part III.A (discussing the NY SAFE Act of 2013). 
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Under the new law, such rifles can be lawfully possessed by their current 
owners but cannot be transferred to another person within the state.61  
Thus, as the current owners pass away or leave New York, the state will 
gradually become denuded of lawfully owned rifles of the covered types.  
As one might anticipate, the implementation of this goal is aided by a 
registration mechanism.  The law required current lawful owners of the 
rifles to register their arms with the state by April 15, 2014, and to keep 
their address information regularly updated.62 
III.  WEIGHING THE RISKS:  RECENT EVIDENCE 
FROM THE STATES AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
While the registration-to-confiscation slope is plausible, and has 
indeed transpired in some jurisdictions, various factors will influence the 
seriousness of the slippery slope risk in practice.  One factor is the strength 
of the political desire of gun control supporters to pursue broadly 
confiscatory laws.  Even if A makes B more practicable, adopting A still 
will not increase the net risk that B will come to pass if there is no reason 
to believe that anyone will ever actually attempt B.   
As I discuss in this Part, recent state measures suggest that there is 
considerable political will for broadly prohibitory gun measures.  There is 
also an emerging belief, among at least some gun control supporters, that 
such measures must be pursued with as little democratic deliberation as 
possible. 
The mass murder committed at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 
December 2012 united Americans in grief and revulsion.63  But the atrocity 
did not, as some expected, generate a political consensus in favor of 
increased gun control.  Instead, gun policy has become increasingly 
polarized.  In a series of parallel legislative pushes in the wake of Sandy 
Hook, some states—such as New York, Connecticut, and Colorado—
enacted restrictive new gun laws.64  Others, especially in the southern and 
                                                                                                                
61 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.00.22(a), (f)–(h) (McKinney 2013). 
62 Id. §§ 265.00.22(h), 400.00.16(a). 
63 See Eli Saslow, Seeking Calm Amid the Terror, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2012, at A01 (unfolding 
the events at Sandy Hook Elementary).  A twenty-year-old gunman killed his mother with a .22 rifle, 
stole her firearms, and traveled to a Connecticut elementary school that he had once attended.  There he 
murdered twenty-six people, twenty of them children, before killing himself.  It was the second-
deadliest mass shooting in American history.  Marc Fisher et al., Gunman Kills Mother, Then 26 in 
Conn. Grade School Before Turning Gun on Himself, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1. 
64 New York’s sweeping new gun control statute, the NY SAFE Act of 2013, is discussed in detail 
in Part III.A.  Colorado enacted narrower limits, prohibiting the acquisition of new magazines holding 
over fifteen rounds and mandating background checks and official recordkeeping for private transfers 
of firearms and magazines.  COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-12-301, 18-12-302, 18-12-112 (2013); see 
Matthew DeLuca, Colorado Gov. Hickenlooper Signs Landmark Gun-Control Bills, NBC NEWS (Mar. 
20, 2013), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/03/20/17387348-colorado-gov-hickenlooper-signs-
landmark-gun-control-bills (describing the effect of the new gun laws).  The new restrictions were 
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western states, responded by expanding the ability of citizens to carry guns 
for the protection of themselves and others.65  At both federal and state 
levels, we have seen an apparent return to the type of intense conflict over 
gun policy last witnessed in the early 1990s.66 
The following Sections examine two recent pro-gun control legislative 
efforts, one at the state level and one at the federal level.  It is important to 
consider what these proposals reveal about the risk of governmental 
overreaching. 
A.  State Level Restrictions:  The NY SAFE Act as a Sudden Descent of the 
Slope 
New York was the first state to enact new gun restrictions in the wake 
of the Sandy Hook murders.67  The NY SAFE Act of 2013,68 the state’s 
                                                                                                                
politically controversial, and opposition to them played a key role in Colorado’s unprecedented 
September 2013 special elections in which two state senators (including the then-serving senate 
president) were successfully recalled from office by voters, in part for their support of the new gun 
restrictions.  See Lynn Bartels et al., Democrats Giron and Morse Ousted, DENVER POST, Sept. 11, 
2013, at A11 (describing the recalls as a “message intended to stop other politicians for pushing for 
firearms restrictions”). 
Connecticut’s Public Act 13-3 was enacted on April 4, 2013, and extensively amended by Public 
Act 13-220 on June 18, 2013.  The state’s definition of “assault weapons” now includes not only a 
lengthy list of specifically prohibited models, including AR-15 pattern rifles and any “copies or 
duplicates of those firearms,” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-202a(1)(B) (2013), but also any semiautomatic 
centerfire rifle capable of accepting a detachable magazine that has any one of a list of common 
features, such as an adjustable stock, a thumbhole stock, or a pistol grip, id. § 53-202a(1)(E).  The 
future sale or (in most cases) the transfer of firearm magazines capable of accepting more than ten 
rounds of ammunition is also prohibited.  Id. § 52-202w(a)–(c).  The many existing magazines with 
over ten-round capacities that were lawfully possessed by Connecticut citizens are required to be 
registered with the state.  Id. § 53-202x(a)(1).  A Second Amendment challenge to the main prohibitory 
features of Connecticut’s new law was rejected in Shew v. Malloy, 994 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239 (D. Conn. 
2014); the case is now on appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
65 See, e.g., H.B. 1700, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (repealing, in effect, 
Arkansas’s requirement for a state-issued permit in order to carry a concealed or open handgun for self-
protection); H.B. 1622, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013) (freeing private schools to allow licensed 
individuals to carry handguns on school property); H.B. 1087, 2013 Leg., 88th Sess. (S.D. 2013) 
(authorizing public school districts to adopt policies for arming teachers); see also Jack Nicas & Joe 
Palazzolo, Pro-Gun Laws Gain Ground: Since Newtown Massacre, More States Ease Regulations than 
Bolster Them, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2013, at A1 (“[S]ince [Newtown], states have passed more 
measures expanding rather than restricting the right to carry firearms.”). 
66 See, e.g., Richard M. Aborn, The Battle Over the Brady Bill and the Future of Gun Control 
Advocacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 417, 419, 421, 424 (1995) (describing the “long and tortuous 
struggle” that led to the enactment of the 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, and observing 
that the debate over the Brady Act “divid[ed] gun control supporters and opponents with a vehemence 
generally reserved for the most contentious social issues”). 
67 Shushannah Walshe, New York Passes Nation’s Toughest Gun Control Law, 
ABCNEWS (Jan. 15, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/york-state-passes-toughest-gun-control-law-
nation/story?id=18224091#.UZKhIbVwrPo. 
68 New York Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act (NY SAFE Act), N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 265.00 (McKinney 2013). 
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new gun control package, is extraordinary in several respects, and the same 
can be said of the process by which it was enacted.  The constitutionality 
of the Act’s restrictions is being litigated before the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit as this Article goes to publication.69  Supporters of a 
robust Second Amendment right can justifiably conclude that the 
enactment of the NY SAFE Act marked a sudden movement by the 
nation’s third largest state to a destination well down the slippery slope.  
The measure accordingly merits close attention. 
1.  Scope of Prohibitions 
The NY SAFE Act imposes the most severe restrictions in American 
history on the ownership and use of ammunition magazines for handguns 
and rifles.  Under the Act, it is illegal to load any magazine with more than 
seven rounds of ammunition—even for the purpose of self-protection 
within one’s own home.70  Several coastal states adopted ten round 
magazine limitations in the 1990s,71 but there is no American precedent for 
a limitation to seven rounds.  Many of the earliest self-loading pistols, such 
as the Colt Model 1903, were sold on the civilian commercial market over 
a century ago with magazine capacities larger than seven rounds.72  Under 
the terms of the Act, it is a crime for a New Yorker who lawfully owns one 
of these century-old pistols to load it to its designed capacity.73  
Today, many of the most commonly owned handgun models come 
with standard magazines holding ten to seventeen rounds.74  There are also 
                                                                                                                
69 A federal district court opinion upheld most of the restrictions in the Act against a Second 
Amendment challenge, but held unconstitutional its prohibition on loading more than seven rounds of 
ammunition in a firearm for self-defense.  N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d 
349, 368–73 (W.D.N.Y. 2013).  For a discussion of constitutional litigation regarding the NY SAFE 
Act, see infra Part IV.G. 
70 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.00(23), 265.37.  A violation is punishable by imprisonment for the 
first offense if an individual possesses a magazine loaded with eight or more rounds outside the home 
and for second or subsequent offenses if an individual possesses such magazine inside the home.  Id. 
§ 265.37.  This part of the Act has been held invalid by a federal district court.  Cuomo, 990 F. Supp.2d 
at 372–73.  The state of New York has cross-appealed that part of the district court’s judgment. 
71 See VERONICA ROSE, OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, LAWS ON 
HIGH CAPACITY MAGAZINES R-0039 (2013), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/rpt/2013-R-
0039.htm (noting that California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, and New York banned or restricted large 
capacity magazines, which they defined “as a magazine capable of accepting more than 10 rounds”).  
72 See THE GUN DIGEST BUYER’S GUIDE TO GUNS 190 (Derrek Sigler ed., 2008) (noting that Colt 
Model 1903 Pocket Hammerless pistol was manufactured from 1903 to 1945 and that all models 
chambered for the .32 ACP cartridge used eight-round magazines); Rick Hacker, Colt 1903 Pocket 
Hammerless, AM. RIFLEMAN (June 19, 2013), http://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/colt-1903-
pocket-hammerless (describing the introduction and popularity of the pistol).  
73 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.37. 
74 JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 9; see Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that firearms with magazine capacities larger than ten rounds were 
already widely owned by private citizens in the 1990s and are properly regarded as being in “common 
use” today). 
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popular pistol models with factory magazines holding seven rounds or 
less.75  But these are mostly small, highly concealable pistols meant for 
routine carry by handgun carry permit holders.76  Ironically, this is a 
purpose for which few New Yorkers can lawfully use a gun, given the 
state’s restrictive laws governing carrying handguns for self-defense 
outside the home.77 
As originally enacted, the SAFE Act prohibited the acquisition of any 
magazine capable of holding more than seven rounds.78  Since the standard 
magazines for most semi-automatic pistols are designed to hold eight or 
more rounds, seven-round magazines are not even available for most 
pistols.79  Thus, the rushed SAFE Act also originally functioned as a ban 
on most handguns.  New York Governor Andrew Cuomo expressed 
surprise at this fact, admitting that he had inadvertently signed a bill that 
made it impossible to lawfully own most pistols in a functional condition.80  
An amendment altered the ban to permit New Yorkers to acquire 
magazines with capacities of up to ten rounds—but not to load more than 
seven rounds in them.81  
Before the enactment of the legislation, Governor Cuomo stated that 
“confiscation [of assault weapons] could be an option,”82 and the SAFE 
Act does include several confiscatory provisions.  In 1994, New York had 
banned the sale of new magazines holding over ten rounds, with a 
                                                                                                                
75 See 12 Concealed Carry Guns 12 Ounces or Less, PERSONAL DEF. SOLUTION, 
http://www.personaldefensesolutions.net/free-resources/concealed-carry-guns-12-ounces-or-less/ (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2014) (describing popular pistols with magazines holding seven or less rounds). 
76 Probably the best selling type of handgun over the past half-decade has been a new generation 
of tiny semi-automatic pistols chambered in the .380 ACP caliber that typically weigh less than twelve 
ounces loaded.  Id.  Between 2008 and 2011, just three major gun manufacturers—Ruger, Smith & 
Wesson, and Kel-Tec—together produced over one million concealable .380 pistols.  BUREAU OF 
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, ANNUAL FIREARMS MANUFACTURERS AND EXPORT 
REPORT (2011); BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, ANNUAL FIREARMS 
MANUFACTURERS AND EXPORT REPORT (2010); BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & 
EXPLOSIVES, ANNUAL FIREARMS MANUFACTURERS AND EXPORT REPORT (2009); BUREAU OF 
ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, ANNUAL FIREARMS MANUFACTURERS AND EXPORT 
REPORT (2008).  The magazine capacity of these pistols is typically six rounds.  See 12 Concealed 
Carry Guns 12 Ounces or Less, supra note 75. 
77 See Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 88, 98, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding 
New York’s “may-issue” handgun carry law, under which officials may refuse to authorize a citizen to 
carry a handgun unless she can demonstrate a special need for armed self-defense beyond that of most 
of the population). 
78 Erik Kriss, A Misfiring Squad Red-Faced NY Pols Rewrite 7-Bullet Law, N.Y. POST, Mar. 22, 
2013, at 8. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.36, 265.37 (McKinney 2013). 
82 Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo Says He’ll Outline Gun Proposal Next Month, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2012, at A29 (quoting remarks of Governor Andrew Cuomo during a radio interview about the 
upcoming gun control effort). 
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grandfathering provision that allowed owners of higher capacity magazines 
to continue to possess them.83  The SAFE Act eliminated the 
grandfathering provision and requires owners of these magazines to 
destroy them, turn them in to the government, or remove them from the 
state by April 2014.84 
The Act also expanded New York’s definition of prohibited “assault 
weapons” to include a number of common semi-automatic rifles.85  It 
requires currently possessed rifles to be registered with the state police and 
imposes a slow-moving program of confiscation by prohibiting their 
current possessors from selling or transferring them to another state 
citizen.86 
2.  Impact on Legitimate Self-Defense 
Obeying the SAFE Act’s magazine restrictions is likely to impair 
armed self-defense in the home, the interest that the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated the Second Amendment “elevates above all other interests.”87  
Armed confrontations vary greatly from instance to instance, making it 
difficult to predict the effects of ammunition restrictions in a specific case.  
But there is extensive evidence to show that hitting an assailant with 
effective gunfire during the stress of a violent confrontation is a demanding 
task, even for trained law enforcement officers.  The New York City Police 
Department reported in 2006 that its officers had a hit rate slightly below 
thirty percent in confrontations; that is, on average about seven rounds out 
of every ten fired by officers missed their target.88  Although some private 
                                                                                                                
83 ROSE, supra note 71. 
84 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.00.22(h). 
85 Any semi-automatic rifle that is in a centerfire caliber and accepts a detachable magazine is 
now classified as an “assault weapon” if it has any of the following features: a “folding or telescoping 
stock,” “thumbhole stock,” “protruding grip that can be held by the non-trigger hand,” bayonet mount, 
flash suppressor, “muzzle break,” or grenade launcher.  Id. § 265.00.22(a).  “Muzzle break” should be 
“muzzle brake,” a piece of metal that attaches to the end of a gun’s barrel and vents escaping gases to 
the side to reduce recoil. 
86 Id. §§ 265.00.22(h), 400.00.16(a); see supra text accompanying notes 61–62 (describing how 
the law will effectively remove these regulated guns from New York as the current owners pass away 
or leave the state).  Possessors can lawfully sell the rifle to an out-of-state party.  N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 265.00.22(h). 
87 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
88 See Al Baker, A Hail of Bullets, a Heap of Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2007, § 4, at 4 
(reporting that statistics contained in the NYPD’s 2006 Firearms Discharge Report produced a “hit 
rate” in officer-involved shootings of 28.3%).  Interestingly, more recent NYPD annual reports have 
ceased disclosing the department’s firearms “hit rate,” choosing instead to disclose only the percentage 
rate at which officers ultimately resolved confrontations in their favor.  See, e.g., N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, 
ANNUAL FIREARMS DISCHARGE REPORT 2011, at 24 (2012), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/nypd_annual_firearms_discharg
e_report_2011.pdf (“[T]he Department does not calculate average hit percentages.  Instead, the 
objective completion rate per incident is employed as it is both more accurate and more instructive. . . . 
When an officer properly and lawfully adjudges a threat severe enough to require the use of his or her 
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citizens are highly proficient with firearms, others are not, and most private 
citizens are not required to qualify periodically with their firearms as 
police officers must.89  Thus, one could reason that the SAFE Act confines 
the defender to a mean expected outcome of, perhaps, no more than two 
hits before having to stop and reload her handgun. 
It is proverbial in self-defense training and law enforcement circles that 
handguns cannot be counted upon to stop an assailant with a single bullet; 
multiple hits are frequently required.90  Thus, it is doubtful whether a 
SAFE-compliant citizen can expect to reliably defend herself with a 
handgun against a home invasion, particularly one involving more than a 
single perpetrator.  That is a serious cost, since each year approximately a 
quarter million residential burglaries result in violence against the 
occupants.91 
Other features of the SAFE Act imply a dismissive attitude to the use 
of firearms for self-defense.  The text of the measure never acknowledges 
an interest in using privately owned firearms for self-defense, even though 
this is, in the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, the “core lawful purpose” 
                                                                                                                
firearm, and fires at a specific subject, the most relevant measure is whether he or she ultimately hits 
and stops the subject.”).  In one highly publicized recent episode in midtown Manhattan, two NYPD 
officers expended sixteen rounds of ammunition in order to stop a lone suspect who pointed a handgun 
at them at close range.  Joseph Goldstein & Wendy Ruderman, Decision by 2 Officers to Open Fire in 
Busy Midtown Leaves Bystanders Wounded, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2012, at A17.  The officers’ gunfire 
hit the suspect at least seven times.  The suspect did not fire.  Nine innocent bystanders were injured by 
the officers’ gunfire.  Id.  Two weeks earlier, two other NYPD officers expended twelve rounds of 
ammunition in order to stop a single suspect armed with a kitchen knife.  Patrick McGeehan, Officials 
Defend Fatal Shooting of a Knife-Wielding Man Near Times Sq., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2012, at A13. 
89 A few states do require holders of state-issued handgun carry permits to pass a live-fire 
requalification every few years.  See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-6(F) (1978) (requiring a live-fire 
refresher course at four-year intervals for permit renewal); id. § 29-19-7 (defining the proficiency test 
requirements). 
90 See MASSAD F. AYOOB, IN THE GRAVEST EXTREME: THE ROLE OF THE FIREARM IN PERSONAL 
PROTECTION 105 (1980) (“Literally hundreds of shooting instances have shown that a gunman can take 
several .38 slugs in vital areas, and still keep coming.”); UREY W. PATRICK & JOHN C. HALL, IN 
DEFENSE OF SELF AND OTHERS . . . : ISSUES, FACTS & FALLACIES—THE REALITIES OF LAW 
ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF DEADLY FORCE 95 (2005) (“The will to survive and to fight despite horrific 
damage to the body is commonplace on the battlefield, and on the street. . . . This also explains why a 
police officer ‘had to shoot him so many times’ . . . .”).  In one notable 2006 shooting, three 
Pennsylvania police officers were forced to fire over 100 rounds in a gunfight with a lone, handgun-
armed suspect, hitting the suspect seventeen times with handgun and rifle bullets.  PA. STATE POLICE, 
2006 ANNUAL REPORT 109 (2007), available at https://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/docume
nt/336023/psp_2006_annual_report_pdf.  The suspect injured two of the officers in a prolonged 
gunfight.  Id.  The suspect continued to physically resist arrest even after being shot seventeen times.  
DA Rules Deeb Death Justifiable, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Bare, Pa.) (Dec. 7, 2006), 
http://archives.timesleader.com/2006_03/2006_12_07_DA_rules_Deeb_death_justifiable_-tlnews.html. 
91 SHANNAN M. CATALANO, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL 
REPORT, VICTIMIZATION DURING HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 1 (2010) [hereinafter HOUSEHOLD 
BURGLARY REPORT], available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vdhb.pdf.  In the United States, 
each year approximately one million residential burglaries occur when occupants of the dwelling are 
home.  About one in four of these burglaries results in injury to an occupant of the dwelling.  Id. 
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for which the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear 
arms.92  Perhaps the SAFE Act’s most striking feature in this regard is its 
granting an express exemption from the seven-round limit to individuals 
who are participating in shooting sports at a gun range or organized 
competition.93  So shooting sports participants may load up to ten rounds in 
their firearms, but the law contains no similar exception for self-defense in 
one’s dwelling.  This measure that lifts criminal penalties for citizens who 
wish to load their lawfully owned guns with eight rounds of ammunition to 
play a game, but imposes criminal fines or imprisonment on those who 
wish to do the same thing in order to defend their homes and families, is 
symptomatic of a legislative body that has relegated the constitutionally 
protected right of armed self-defense to a shockingly low status. 
3.  Bypassing Legislative Deliberation 
Despite its unprecedented reach, the SAFE Act was enacted in a 
manner that appeared to be designed to minimize legislative deliberation.  
Governor Cuomo designated it as “emergency” legislation, which 
exempted the Act from the normal requirements of legislative committee 
hearings open to the public.94  The need for the emergency designation was 
debatable.  New York had witnessed a tragic and high-profile murder of 
two firefighters in the preceding month,95 but there was no general trend of 
increasing homicide in New York State.  To the contrary, the murder rate 
in New York in 2012 was forty-five percent lower than it had been just 
sixteen years earlier,96 mirroring a national trend of declining crime since 
                                                                                                                
92 Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.  New York Governor Andrew Cuomo tried to reassure gun owners 
during the period leading up to the enactment of the SAFE Act, but he confined his approval to hunting 
and sporting uses of firearms, not their constitutionally protected defensive functions.  See Kaplan, 
supra note 82 (“I don’t think legitimate sportsmen are going to say, ‘I need an assault weapon to go 
hunting’, [Cuomo] said.  At the same time, he noted that he owns a shotgun that he has used for 
hunting, and said, ‘There is a balance here—I understand the rights of gun owners; I understand the 
rights of hunters.’”). 
93 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20.7-f (McKinney 2013).  Certain handgun sports such as “practical 
shooting” are designed for competitors to use magazines with capacities of at least ten rounds, and 
often much higher.  See U.S. PRACTICAL SHOOTING ASS’N, HANDGUN COMPETITION RULES 79 (2014), 
available at http://www.uspsa.org/uspsa-rules.php (noting that Production Division competition uses 
magazines with capacities of up to ten rounds); id. at 76 (showing that the Open Division competition 
allows magazines of any capacity to be used). 
94 Thomas Kaplan, Sweeping Limits on Guns Become Law in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2013, at A15.  
95 On December 24, 2012, a convicted felon—who had previously served seventeen years in 
prison for manslaughter—set a car on fire and then ambushed responding firefighters with an AR-15 
rifle, killing two and wounding two more before committing suicide.  Liz Robbins & Joseph Goldstein, 
Gunman’s Note Said “Killing People” Was What He Liked Best, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2012, at A20. 
96 See Murder Rates Nationally and by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/murder-rates-nationally-and-state (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (listing 
murder rates by year and state).  The murder rate in New York State in 1996 was 7.4 per 100,000 
persons; it declined steadily over the intervening years to 3.5 per 100,000 persons in 2012.  Id. 
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the early 1990s.97  After the emergency designation, the votes in each 
chamber of the New York Legislature were extremely rapid.  Less than 
forty-eight hours elapsed between the bill’s initial introduction and the 
Governor’s signature.98  New Yorkers affected by the Act’s criminalization 
of a wide range of previously lawful conduct were understandably 
disturbed at being shut out from the ordinary channels of public input into 
major legislation.99 
The SAFE Act’s bypassing of public input and legislative deliberation 
may be a harbinger of future gun control efforts.  Professor Adam Winkler 
argues that the failure of federal legislation in 2013 occurred in part 
because the President and Congress allowed too much time to pass, both in 
the run-up to the Senate consideration of Manchin-Toomey, and during the 
Senate’s formal deliberation on the bill.100  Professor Winkler suggests that 
the President and his supporters should act quickly to capitalize on the 
temporary increase in support for gun control that follows a horrific and 
                                                                                                                
97 The annual violent crime rate in the United States declined from 757.7 crimes per 100,000 
people in 1992 to 386.3 per 100,000 in 2011, a reduction of almost half.  Crime in the United States 
2011: Table 1, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-
u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-1 (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).  The rate of murder and non-
negligent manslaughter also declined by almost half in the same period—from 9.3 per 100,000 in 1992 
to 4.7 per 100,000 in 2011.  Id. 
98 See Kaplan, supra note 94 (“Mr. Cuomo signed the bill less than an hour after the State 
Assembly approved it by a 104-to-43 vote on the second full day of the 2013 legislative session.”).  
99 In the wake of the SAFE Act’s passage, Kahr Arms, a well-respected New York-based 
manufacturer of handguns, decided to begin moving its operations out of that state and into 
Pennsylvania.  Rick Karlin, A SAFE Move Out of the State: Swiftness of Gun Control Act Rattles 
Company, TIMES-UNION (Albany, N.Y.), July 2, 2013, at A1.  The gun maker stated that the rushed 
enactment of the SAFE Act destabilized its expectations and created a concern about slippery slopes: 
It wasn’t so much that the measure bans certain kinds of guns and magazines, the 
company said.  Instead, it was the suddenness with which the law was passed—less 
than 24 hours after being released to the public—leaving Kahr’s executives to 
wonder what kind of unforeseen regulations or restrictions might lie ahead.  “One of 
our big concerns was, OK, the SAFE Act was passed in the middle of the night.  
You wake up the next morning and boom, that was it,” said Frank Harris, Kahr’s 
vice president of sales and marketing.  “We just felt like, gee, if they can do this, 
what can they do next?[”]  “It’s not just the SAFE Act, but the uncertainty.”  Harris 
said. 
Id. 
100 Adam Winkler, Who Killed Gun Control?: The Gun Control Bill Is Dead. Why?, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112946/gun-control-failure-2013-who-
responsible.  The author faults President Obama for appointing a commission to study the issue and 
prepare legislative recommendations, contending that “[w]hile the commission acted unusually fast by 
Washington standards, in effect it served to delay unnecessarily the announcement of proposed 
reforms,” which he argues should have been advanced within “days” of the horrifying mass shooting.  
Id.  Instead, a few months after the Sandy Hook shooting, public opinion began to revert to normal 
levels of support and opposition to gun control.  Professor Winkler views this not as a vindication of a 
deliberate approach to enacting major new federal criminal laws affecting millions of American gun 
owners, but as a missed opportunity.  See id. (wondering “what might have been”).  
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widely publicized murder committed with a gun.101  It is not hard to 
imagine some observers reflecting that Congress proceeded in a deliberate 
and transparent fashion after Newtown and did not end up enacting new 
gun restrictions, while the New York Legislature brutally streamlined the 
legislative process and enacted gun restrictions of unprecedented breadth 
and depth.102  Conversely, gun rights supporters may conclude from the 
events in New York, and the advocacy for Congress to “do it faster” next 
time, that the deliberative features of the legislative process may not 
always be available to ward off future excesses.  In short, they may 
conclude that the slope is growing steeper. 
4.  Social Divisiveness 
The SAFE Act proved highly divisive, particularly along regional lines 
and rural versus urban lines.  It has pitted the greater New York City area 
against the less densely populated remainder of the state, with especially 
intense opposition in northern and western New York.103 
Fifty-two of New York’s sixty-two counties and over two hundred 
municipalities in the state have enacted resolutions calling for repeal or 
revision of the SAFE Act, many asserting that portions of the Act are 
unconstitutional.104  The New York Sheriffs Association likewise called for 
the repeal of the magazine and rifle ban provisions, and some county 
sheriffs in upstate and western New York have publicly refused to enforce 
                                                                                                                
101 See id. (“After Newtown, it was clear to everyone on the gun control side that speed was of the 
essence.  The longer it took to move a bill to the floor for a vote, the harder it would be to win.”). 
102 See Joe Mahoney, Guns, Manor Fueled Yearlong Feuds, DAILY STAR (Dec. 28, 2013), 
http://www.thedailystar.com/localnews/x1221283740/Guns-Manor-fueled-yearlong-feuds (noting that 
New York was the first state to enact gun control legislation in response to the Newtown shooting, 
coming even before the Obama Administration could react).  It is important to be clear: Professor 
Winkler did not endorse or even discuss New York’s drastic procedure in enacting the SAFE Act.  In 
fact, he expresses regret that President Obama entangled the Manchin-Toomey effort to expand 
recordkeeping on gun transfers with the more galvanizing issue of “assault weapon” bans.  See 
Winkler, supra note 100 (stating that the proposed rifle and magazine bans “played right into the 
hands” of opponents).  But the argument is capable of extension.  One could infer that the relative 
circumspection and public debate that led up to the Manchin-Toomey vote should be avoided generally 
in future gun control pushes, which should rely as much as possible on leveraging the understandable 
and appropriate surge of outrage and disgust that follows atrocities—even in a country that is actually 
experiencing a secular decline in the rate of violent crime.  See supra note 97.   
103 See NY SAFE RESOLUTIONS, http://www.nysaferesolutions.com/resolutions/#counties (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2014) (illustrating the divide between cities that support the SAFE Act and the areas 
that oppose it, which include most of the more rural areas of upstate New York). 
104 Id.  For an example of the county resolutions, consider Onondaga County’s enactment calling 
for the repeal of the SAFE Act, criticizing its passage as having taken place “without meaningful public 
input,” and declaring that “multiple provisions” of the act “infringe upon Constitutional rights of law-
abiding citizens to keep and bear arms.”  Onondaga County, N.Y., Memorializing Opposition to the 
New York Safe Act (Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://ongov.net/legislature/documents/3.5.13Adopted
LegislationOCR.pdf. 
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the Act, citing constitutional concerns.105   
B.  Misinformation from Prominent Federal Officials 
 The actions and statements of prominent federal officials are also 
relevant to gauging the political threat to gun rights.  President Obama did 
not merely press for expanded transfer recordkeeping after the Sandy Hook 
atrocity, but also pursued bans on future sales of the AR-15, the best-
selling type of rifle in the country, as well as types of magazines owned in 
the tens of millions by private citizens.106  Within days of the Sandy Hook 
murders, President Obama appointed as the head of his gun control task 
force Vice President Joseph Biden.107  During the public debate that led to 
the Manchin-Toomey vote, Biden made several strikingly ignorant or 
misleading public statements about armed self-defense. 
In a Facebook interview, Biden responded to a citizen’s concerns that 
the bans the President was seeking would restrict her ability to acquire 
effective firearms for self-defense.108  Biden reassured her that she would 
be adequately protected from home invasions by “get[ting] a double-
barreled shotgun” and “fir[ing] two blasts outside the house” if she 
perceived a threat.109  Biden specifically denigrated the self-defense utility 
of modern rifles like the AR-15.110  In an interview with Field & Stream 
magazine, the Vice President doubled down, remarking that “[if] you want 
to keep someone away from your house, just fire the shotgun through the 
                                                                                                                
105 Mark Boshnack, Local Sheriff: I Won’t Enforce Gun Law, DAILY STAR (Sept. 7, 2013), 
http://thedailystar.com/localnews/x312424432/Local-sheriff-I-wont-enforce-gun-law/.  Media reports 
suggest that other police officers in the state are also reluctant to actively enforce the Act’s 
unprecedented prohibitions.  See Joseph Spector, State Police Issue “Field Guide” for N.Y.’s Gun Law, 
ROCHESTER DEMOCRAT & CHRON. (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/l
ocal/2013/10/07/state-police-issue-field-guide-for-nys-gun-law/2939035/ (quoting a state legislator’s 
remark that police have told him that they would not seek out violators of the Act: “These guys want 
nothing to do with the SAFE Act, and they are not going to enforce the SAFE Act, except if they have a 
bad guy and they are putting him under arrest and there are other charges”). 
106 Winkler, supra note 100.  Even some gun control supporters criticized this decision.  See id. 
(“Focusing on assault weapons played right into the hands of the NRA, which has for years been saying 
that Obama wanted to ban guns.  Gun control advocates ridiculed that idea—then proposed to ban the 
most popular rifle in America.”). 
107 Jonathan Lemire, President Obama Appoints Vice President Biden to Lead Gun Violence Task 
Force, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/obama-
appoints-biden-lead-gun-violence-task-force-article-1.1223549.  
108 Andrew Johnson & Eliana Johnson, Biden to Woman: You Don’t Need an AR-15,                     
It’s Harder to Aim, It’s Harder to Use, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/341055/biden-woman-you-dont-need-ar-15-its-harder-aim-its-
harder-use-andrew-johnson. 
109 The exchange occurred during an online “town hall” meeting sponsored by Parents magazine.  
See id. (including a video clip of Biden’s remarks). 
110 See id. (“You don’t need an AR-15, it’s harder to aim, it’s harder to use.”). 
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door.”111 
It is not easy to know where to begin detailing the misinformation in 
these statements.  A double-barreled shotgun is a notoriously heavy-
recoiling weapon, particularly when loaded with appropriate ammunition 
for self-defense, such as buckshot shells.  A 12 gauge shotgun with 
buckshot shells kicks as much as a large-caliber rifle that a hunter might 
use to hunt large game like elk or moose.112  In contrast, an AR-15 carbine 
(or compact rifle) firing its small .223 Remington cartridge has less than 
one-fifth as much recoil energy as the shotgun.113  This difference is 
immediately obvious in use.  It makes the light-kicking carbine less 
physically punishing to train with and more manageable for small statured 
shooters, and aids in firing accurate follow up shots if needed.  And unlike 
a typical double-barreled shotgun, most AR-15s come with adjustable 
stocks that can be shortened or lengthened to fit the owner’s body type.114  
This is not to deny that a shotgun can be a good home defense tool for a 
user with the ability, training, and inclination to choose it.  But many users 
who make the comparison will find the Vice President’s description of the 
two firearms to be plainly wrong, noting that the carbine’s pinpoint 
accuracy115 and soft recoil make it more controllable than the hard-kicking 
shotgun and its cloud of shot. 
                                                                                                                
111  Anthony Licata, The F&S Gun Rights Interviews: Joe Biden, Vice President of the United 
States, FIELD & STREAM (Feb. 25, 2013), http://www.fieldandstream.com/articles/guns/2013/02/gun-
control-joe-biden-interview. 
 112 I calculated recoil for typical buckshot loads in a shotgun and typical .223 rifle loads in an AR-
15 carbine, using the guidelines and formulae supplied by the Sporting Arms and Ammunition 
Manufacturers Institute (“SAAMI”), the chief professional standards organization for arms and 
ammunition manufacturers.  See Gun Recoil Formulae, SPORTING ARMS & AMMUNITION 
MANUFACTURERS’ INST., INC. (May 1, 1976), http://www.saami.org/PubResources/GunRecoilFormula
e.pdf.  The figures used for the shotgun represented 12 gauge 2 3/4 inch 9 pellet 00 buckshot load: 492 
grains (1 and 1/8 ounces) projectile; 43 grains wad; 30 grains powder charge; velocity 1325 feet per 
second; 7.5 pound shotgun.  This yields a total of about 25 pounds of free recoil energy from firing the 
gun.  Id.  This is equivalent to firing a powerful hunting rifle in a cartridge like the .300 Winchester 
Magnum, which is often used for hunting large game like elk or moose and has recoil energy of about 
23 to 25 pounds in a typical rifle.  Chuck Hawks, Rifle Recoil Table, CHUCKHAWKS.COM, 
http://www.chuckhawks.com/recoil_table.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2014). 
113 Gun Recoil Formulae, supra note 112.  The method used to calculate AR-15 recoil was the 
same one described in the immediately preceding note.  I used the following figures, typical of a full 
metal jacket loading in a .223 Remington or the very similar 5.56x45 mm NATO (M193) cartridge 
fired in an AR-15 rifle: 55 grain bullet; 25 grains powder charge; velocity 3200 feet per second; 7 
pound rifle.  This yields a total of just 4.5 pounds of free recoil energy for the AR-15.  Id. 
114 Courtland Milloy, Gun Bans Are No Silver Bullet, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2013, at B01.  
Adjustable stocks on semi-automatic rifles are criminal under the “assault weapon” laws of some states, 
e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.00.22(a), 265.02 (McKinney 2013), but are legal and commonplace in 
many parts of America, see Editorial, The Guns of Clinton, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 1994, at A12. 
115 See, e.g., PATRICK SWEENEY, MODERN LAW ENFORCEMENT WEAPONS & TACTICS 181–82 (3d 
ed. 2004) (noting that law enforcement officers choose rifles from the AR-15 family in part because of 
their accuracy; such rifles can easily produce groups of less than two inches at one hundred yards). 
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Vice President Biden also bizarrely chose to recommend a double-
barreled shotgun, a type of gun that has been obsolete for defensive 
purposes for well over a century because it holds a perilously low two 
shots—fine for a sporting challenge when hunting doves, but not for 
protecting one’s life.116  Even police officers well trained with shotguns 
commonly miss with a significant number of shots fired in the stress of a 
lethal force confrontation;117 a lone householder is likely subject to the 
same risk. 
Instead of an appropriate repeating firearm such as a semi-automatic 
shotgun, a handgun, or a carbine like an AR-15—or even a pump action 
shotgun, a repeating design that dates from the nineteenth century118—
Biden recommended acquiring an obsolete, hard-kicking two-shot firearm, 
and then discharging it (twice) prior to encountering or identifying 
intruders.119  Following this advice would of course leave the householder 
temporarily unarmed in any subsequent confrontation.  Equally bad, firing 
off a lethal weapon when one has not visually confirmed one’s target is a 
gross violation of firearm safety rules.120  It is a criminal offense in most 
places.121  If an innocent person were injured by the sort of blind warning 
shots recommended by Vice President Biden, the homeowner’s conduct 
would certainly be deemed tortious and would likely constitute a felonious 
                                                                                                                
116 See AYOOB, supra note 90, at 101 (“Don’t rely on a double-barrel shotgun.  It looks 
frightening, but a one-or-two shot weapon is not something to rely on against even one 
opponent . . . .”); JOHN S. FARNAM, THE FARNAM METHOD OF DEFENSIVE SHOTGUN AND RIFLE 
SHOOTING 47 (2d ed. 2010) (“The repeater (pump or auto-loader) is the only shotgun type that I 
recommend for defensive use.  With the repeater, the [o]perator is able to fire quickly and accurately at 
multiple targets and still retain control.  Bolt-action, double-barrel, and single-shot shotguns are best 
confined to sport and recreational shooting.”). 
117 See Massad Ayoob, Consider the 20 Gauge Shotgun, BACKWOODS HOME MAG., Nov./Dec. 
2009, at 74, 78 (reporting that well-trained officers of the Los Angeles Police Department maintained a 
hit rate of fifty-eight percent with their shotguns in armed confrontations).  This is better accuracy than 
the sub-30% hit rate reported by the NYPD several years ago.  See supra note 88.  The difference may 
reflect a focus on shootings involving one type of long gun (LAPD) versus all guns, including 
handguns (NYPD).  It may also reflect differences in training and/or proficiency between the two 
departments in different periods. 
118 The Winchester Model 1893 pump action shotgun was introduced to the market in its 
namesake year.  R.L. WILSON, WINCHESTER: AN AMERICAN LEGEND 212, 214 (1991).  Its successor, 
the Model 1897, became a wide commercial success, with over one million copies sold by the time the 
shotgun was discontinued in 1945.  Id. at 214. 
119 Johnson & Johnson, supra note 108 (emphasis added). 
120 One of the canonical rules of gun safety, widely taught in firearms safety and familiarization 
classes, commands against firing a gun before one has visually confirmed one’s target and what may be 
behind it.  JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 6–7; see NRA Gun Safety Rules, NRA, 
http://training.nra.org/nra-gun-safety-rules.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (“Know your target and 
what is beyond.  Be absolutely sure you have identified your target beyond any doubt.  Equally 
important, be aware of the area beyond your target.”). 
121 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 752.863a (LexisNexis 2013) (classifying “recklessly or 
heedlessly . . . discharg[ing] any firearm without due caution and circumspection for the rights, safety 
or property of others” as a misdemeanor). 
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criminal offense.122 
In sum, the advice given by the Vice President was so obviously 
counterproductive that it appears to reflect a disdain for the very practice of 
defensive gun ownership, or a gross ignorance of basic aspects of the 
subject on which he was then the acting chair of a national policy task 
force.  Many citizens were understandably outraged in 2012 by 
Representative Todd Akin’s uninformed remarks about rape and abortion, 
a matter that—like self-defense—touches upon the right to bodily integrity 
and issues of life or death.123  In a country with over one million home 
invasion burglaries a year, about a quarter of which result in injury to an 
occupant,124 Vice President Biden’s deeply uninformed remarks on armed 
self-defense were similarly unsettling.   
Unfortunately, some other federal elected officials have also 
demonstrated comparable ignorance while advocating for gun control in 
the aftermath of Sandy Hook.125   
These attitudes have a broader effect that destabilizes efforts at 
compromise.  This does not even require gun rights supporters to question 
                                                                                                                
122 Cf. Steven Nelson, Biden Advises Shooting Shotgun Through Door: Virginia Beach Man 
Charged for Doing Exactly That, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Feb. 28,                                              
2013), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/02/28/biden-advises-shooting-shotgun-through-door 
(noting that a Virginia homeowner was charged with reckless handling of a firearm after discharging 
his shotgun through windows and a closed door when he believed intruders were present).  The same 
article reports the opinions of attorneys from Biden’s home state of Delaware that discharging a 
shotgun into the air in the absence of an imminent threat could lead to felony charges of reckless 
endangerment.  Id. 
123 Catalina Camia, Todd Akin Says He’d Take Back Rape Comments, USA TODAY ON                             
POL. BLOG (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/onpolitics/2013/04/26/akin-rape-senate-
missouri/2115311/.  Akin, then a U.S. Congressman, responded to a question about whether women 
should be able to obtain abortions when pregnancy results from rape.  His answer was factually 
ungrounded, claiming that this risk rarely arose because in cases of “legitimate rape,” the “female body 
has ways to try to shut that whole thing down.”  Id.  The remarks were widely covered in the media, 
prompted an outcry, and are generally credited with changing the course of Akin’s bid for a Missouri 
U.S. Senate seat, leading to his defeat by Claire McCaskill in the 2012 general election.  Id. 
124 HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY REPORT, supra note 91, at 1.  
125 U.S. Representative Diana DeGette of Colorado, a gun control supporter who has sponsored 
several bills seeking to restrict firearm magazines, drew criticism in the spring of 2013 for declaring at 
a public forum that banning magazines with higher capacities would succeed because “the people who 
have those now, they’re going to shoot them, so if you ban them in the future, the number of these 
high-capacity magazines is going to decrease dramatically over time because the bullets will have been 
shot and there won’t be any more available.”  Allison Sherry, Inaccurate Remarks on Gun Magazines 
Put Rep. Diana DeGette Under Scrutiny, DENVER POST (Apr. 7, 2013), 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_22971620/inaccurate-remarks-gun-magazines-put-rep-diana-
degette.  In reality, of course, a detachable magazine can easily be reloaded with ammunition once it is 
fired empty—that is precisely what it is for.  See Allison Sherry, Inaccurate Remarks on Gun 
Magazines Put Rep. Diana DeGette Under Scrutiny, DENVER POST (Apr. 7, 2013), 
http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_22971620/inaccurate-remarks-gun-magazines-put-rep-diana-
degette (quoting a political scientist’s conclusion that DeGette’s remarks were significant because they 
showed she was “clearly uninformed about the basic mechanics of the item she wants to further 
regulate”).  A single competent staff briefing could have conveyed this information in a few minutes. 
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opponents’ good faith.  It is hard for one side to trust that its counterparts 
will refrain in the future from enacting restrictions that end up profoundly 
impairing the exercise of gun rights when it becomes evident that some of 
those counterparts—including highly placed officials—do not understand 
basic facts about how the right to arms is practiced in American society. 
IV.  JUDICIAL (UNDER-) ENFORCEMENT OF THE  
SECOND AMENDMENT IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS 
IN THE FIRST HALF-DECADE AFTER D.C. V. HELLER 
Another important factor in measuring the slippery-slope risk is how 
willing courts are to act as a backstop to block restrictive legislation by 
holding it unconstitutional, and thus to prevent a progression from sliding 
down the slope.  Courts that recognize and credibly enforce constitutional 
rights provide assurance that legislation imposing additional regulation (A) 
will not be allowed to lead to drastic or prohibitory restrictions (B), and 
this should make A more potentially acceptable to those who believe in the 
importance of the regulated activity.126 
For much of the past half-century, elite legal and cultural commentary 
denied the premise of this anti-slippery slope argument.  This view, 
expressed by the American Bar Association’s legislative counsel as 
recently as 1995, was that individuals had no personal right to arms: “[T]he 
Second Amendment, with regard to gun-control legislation affecting 
private individuals, is not relevant in a prohibitive sense.”127  Or as U.S. 
Solicitor General Seth Waxman famously affirmed in responding to a 
citizen’s letter in 2000, the executive branch believed that government 
could (in the letter’s words) lawfully “take guns away from the public” and 
“restrict ownership of rifles, pistols and shotguns from all people,” since 
the Second Amendment did not “extend an individual right to keep and 
bear arms.”128  Federal courts of appeals’ opinions from the latter part of 
the twentieth century similarly proclaimed “there can be no serious claim 
to any express constitutional right of an individual to possess a firearm.”129 
This was surprising in light of the Amendment’s recognition of a “right 
                                                                                                                
126 See Volokh, supra note 12, at 1047–48 (stating that the rigorous protection of constitutional 
rights could lead to compromise in positions on gun control); see also ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: 
THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 294–95 (2011) (expressing hope that the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of an individual right to arms will reduce the plausibility of slippery-slope 
arguments and thereby facilitate compromise in gun control legislation). 
127 DENNIS A. HENIGAN ET AL., GUNS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE MYTH OF SECOND 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FIREARMS IN AMERICA 27 (1995) (noting the statement of ABA 
legislative counsel E. Bruce Nicholson). 
128 Letter from Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Anonymous Recipient 
(Aug. 22, 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.nraila.org/Waxman.pdf. 
129 United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (quoting Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 
149 (6th Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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of the people to keep and bear Arms,” similar to other provisions of the 
Bill of Rights protecting rights of the people.130  Moreover, it had not been 
the view of nineteenth century American courts or commentators, which 
regularly interpreted the Second Amendment and parallel state 
constitutional provisions to protect individual rights to own and use a 
variety of common weapons.131  Outside of the judiciary and the elite 
commentariat,132 twentieth-century voices frequently agreed that an 
individual right was conferred.  Most Americans supported the individual 
right in polls,133 and, in the past thirty years, majorities of Congress twice 
enacted major legislation premised on the belief that the right to arms is a 
fundamental individual right.134 
All this made the pre-Heller Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms a strong candidate for membership in Lawrence Sager’s famous 
category of “underenforced constitutional norms.”135  On the other hand, 
the Supreme Court’s recognition in 2008 that the Second Amendment 
protects a fundamental, individual “right to keep and bear arms for the 
purpose of self-defense”136 raised the prospect that the right to arms would 
emerge from its status as an underenforced norm and become “part of 
                                                                                                                
130 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
131 See David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 
1359, 1377–78 (noting that, in 1803, Henry St. George Tucker believed the Second Amendment 
provided an individual right to bear arms); see also JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 43, at 251, 318 (“Many 
other late nineteenth-century legal commentators discussed the right to bear arms in the context of both 
the federal and state constitutions. . . . [Joel] Bishop viewed the right to bear arms mainly in the context 
of the criminal law of the carrying of weapons.”); Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second 
Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing Arms” for Self-
Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585, 623 (2012) (noting that the courts during the antebellum period often 
interpreted the Constitution as guaranteeing a right to carry weapons). 
132 See David B. Kopel, The Right to Arms in the Living Constitution, 2010 CARDOZO                      
L. REV. DE NOVO 99, 113, http://www.davekopel.org/2A/LawRev/Second-Amendment-in-the-Living-
Constitution.pdf (noting that, in the twentieth century, many lower federal courts asserted that the 
Second Amendment conferred either a collective, state, or militia-only right). 
133 Id. at 117 n.78.  
134 See Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109-92, § 2(a)(2), 119 Stat. 
2095 (2005) (“The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the rights of 
individuals, including those who are not members of a militia or engaged in military service or training, 
to keep and bear arms.”); Firearms Owners’ Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 1(b), 100 
Stat. 449, 449 (“The Congress finds that the rights of citizens to keep and bear arms under the second 
amendment . . . require[s] additional legislation to correct existing firearms statutes and enforcement 
policies . . . .”). 
135 Brannon P. Denning, Gun Shy: The Second Amendment as an “Underenforced Constitutional 
Norm,” 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 719, 787 (1998).  See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair 
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) 
(describing the concept of underenforced constitutional norms). 
136 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026, 3036–37 (2010) (plurality opinion) 
(identifying the recognition of such a right as part of what Heller “held” and holding that the right is 
fundamental); id. at 3059 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing 
with both conclusions). 
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ordinary constitutional law.”137  Has this occurred? 
This Symposium Issue provides an appropriate vantage to look back at 
what is now over half a decade of post-Heller Second Amendment 
litigation in the lower federal courts.  My analysis of the case law will 
focus primarily on the period from June 26, 2008, when Heller was 
decided, through October 15, 2013.  During this period, which I will refer 
to as the study period, hundreds of opinions addressed Second Amendment 
challenges to particular federal, state, and local gun restrictions.  This 
activity requires a fresh consideration of whether the right remains 
underenforced. 
My analysis focuses on litigation in the lower federal courts.  Some 
might interject here that these courts’ relevance to the slippery-slope 
question is dwarfed by a threshold issue: What about the Supreme Court?  
Indeed, if the critical Supreme Court precedents recognizing an individual 
Second Amendment right are not themselves secure, then it is unwise to 
rely on judicial enforcement to avert slippery-slope risks (particularly with 
respect to federal laws, which are not constrained by state constitutional 
protections).  Heller and McDonald were each five to four decisions.  A 
switch of a single vote in the majority would have produced either a 
rejection of a meaningful Second Amendment right (in Heller) or a non-
incorporated right only applicable against the federal government and 
federal enclaves like the District of Columbia (in McDonald).138  The 
principal dissent in McDonald v. Chicago remained opposed to Heller’s 
basic holding, contending that “the Framers did not write the Second 
Amendment in order to protect a private right of armed self-defense.”139  
Justices have continued to criticize Heller in public remarks.140 
This is obviously a basic consideration in gauging the ability of 
judicial enforcement of the Second Amendment to mitigate future slippery 
                                                                                                                
137 Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v. Chicago, 26 J.L. 
& POL’Y 273, 274 (2011).  
138 Indeed, in McDonald v. Chicago, there was no majority opinion on which clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment renders the Second Amendment applicable against the states.  130 S Ct. at 
3026.  Justice Alito’s opinion for a four-Justice plurality concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause incorporates the right to arms, see id. at 3050 (plurality opinion), while Justice 
Thomas concurred separately to argue that the right to arms should instead be treated as a “privilege or 
immunity” of American citizenship that the states are barred from abridging by the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 3059, 3063–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
139 Id. at 3136 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Justice Breyer’s McDonald dissent was also joined by 
Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. 
140 In recent interviews, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed her continued disagreement with 
the Heller decision.  Jessica Chasmar, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg Predicts Another Democrat in 
2016, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/oct/7/ruth-bader-
ginsberg-predicts-another-democrat-2016/; Ginsburg Draws Connection Between Immigration Reform, 
Fair Pay for Women, PRI (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-09-18/ginsburg-draws-
connection-between-immigration-reform-fair-pay-women. 
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slope risks.  I acknowledge the point’s merit, but note that it is hard to 
measure this risk, particularly given the low number of Second 
Amendment cases addressed by the Court141 and the comparative rarity of 
confirming new Supreme Court Justices.  In contrast, the extent of Second 
Amendment enforcement in the lower courts can be analyzed in detail 
now, even holding Heller and McDonald constant.  Nevertheless, this is a 
basic risk that obviously tends to further volatilize slippery slope concerns. 
A.  Distinguishing Institutional vs. Analytical Rationales for Narrow 
Enforcement 
Professor Sager carefully distinguished situations in which federal 
courts enforce constitutional provisions narrowly due to institutional 
concerns about the appropriate role of courts, from those in which the 
courts give a narrow scope to a provision on analytical grounds—that is, 
because they think such an interpretation results from conventional legal 
methods of ascertaining the provision’s textual meaning and scope.142  In 
Sager’s usage of the term, only the former situation, where the narrow 
application rests on institutional concerns, properly qualifies as an example 
of an “underenforced constitutional norm.”143 
That distinction was critical to Sager because his analysis focused on 
the issues posed by the Equal Protection Clause of Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.144  While the Equal Protection Clause is directly 
enforceable in court in many circumstances, the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
fifth section also gives Congress an express power “to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation,” the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the other 
provisions of the amendment.145  Sager’s point was that if federal courts 
chose to limit their enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause on 
                                                                                                                
141 The Supreme Court’s refusal to accept any Second Amendment cases for review since 
deciding McDonald in 2010 has itself prompted speculation about the Court majority’s attitude toward 
the right to arms.  See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Our Gun-Shy Justices: The Supreme Court Abandons the 
Second Amendment, AM. SPECTATOR, http://spectator.org/articles/59552/our-gun-shy-justices (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2014) (“Over the last four years, in case after case, lower courts have accepted 
interpretations of the Second Amendment that have rendered it weak or nonexistent. . . . Each 
time . . . the Supreme Court declined to review the ruling. . . . The Supreme Court, content with the 
status quo, has knowingly and willingly abandoned the Second Amendment to the judges below.”); 
Adam Winkler, UCLA Faculty Voice: Why the Supreme Court Got ‘Gun-Shy’ This Summer (June 20, 
2014), http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/ucla-faculty-voice:-why-the-supreme-court-got-gun-shy-this-
summer (“The justices understand the nation’s need for uniformity, especially when it comes to 
individual rights.  This term, however, the justices weren’t inclined to sort out any such inconsistencies 
involving the Second Amendment.  Indeed, when expressly invited to wade in, they balked.”). 
142 See Sager, supra note 135, at 1239–40 (differentiating between situations in which the 
Supreme Court enforces judicial norms on institutional grounds versus on analytical grounds). 
143 Id. at 1240. 
144 Id. at 1239. 
145 U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 5. 
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institutional grounds relating to the structural limits of the judiciary, that 
choice gave no reason to think that the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as it could be legislatively enforced by Congress pursuant to 
Section 5 must be similarly narrowed.146  Rather, in Sager’s view, 
“Congress can legislate against a broader swath of state practices than the 
[U.S. Supreme] Court has found or would find to violate the norm of equal 
protection, because the federal judiciary’s enforcement of that norm fails to 
exhaust its scope.”147  But where, “because of analytical rather than 
institutional concerns, the Court has determined that given conduct does no 
violence to the substantive norm of the fourteenth amendment,” the 
underenforcement thesis does not apply; hence, “Congress cannot use 
section 5 as authority to legislate against that conduct.”148 
Sager’s narrow definition of “judicial underenforcement” remains 
quite relevant to the post-Heller Second Amendment.  As I will discuss 
momentarily, a number of lower courts continue to use institutional 
rationales for taking a minimalist approach to the Second Amendment.  
But there is a broader and less technical sense in which one can describe a 
right as underenforced.  Judicial decisions, even when relying fully or 
partially on analytical rationales, may consistently take a markedly narrow 
view of a right, especially if the judicial view upholds restrictions that 
render it impractical to engage in conduct that is plausibly viewed as 
constitutionally protected.  This broader sense of underenforcement, too, is 
relevant to the gun control debate.  First, it matters because legislators who 
decide whether to support legislation may wish to consult their own 
independent sense of whether proposed laws—or possible future laws that 
currently proposed enactments would make more probable—contravene 
constitutional guarantees.  The mainstream view in the American political 
tradition holds “that legislators and executive officials have an independent 
duty to interpret and implement the Constitution” in choosing how to 
exercise their lawmaking and law-implementing functions.149  In saying no 
to legislation because of constitutional concerns, a legislator is not bound 
to defer to either analytically or institutionally narrowed constructions 
given to constitutional rights by federal courts.  The degree of judicial 
enforcement we can expect for a given constitutional right is also an 
                                                                                                                
146 See Sager, supra note 135, at 1239 (explaining that Congress may enforce substantive norms 
even though such norms may have been unenforced by the judiciary).  
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 1240 (emphasis added). 
149 H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future of 
Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 241 (2011); see Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator’s 
Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 601 (1975) (arguing that legislators have 
a duty to independently evaluate constitutionality); Denning, supra note 135, at 787 (“[T]his division of 
labor among the branches of government whereby the other branches ignore questions of 
constitutionality and leave those for the courts has not been, in balance, a good thing.”). 
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important factor in gauging whether slippery slopes are plausible.  
Legislators who are worried about descending the slope may care about 
whether courts refrain from closely scrutinizing gun restrictions, regardless 
of whether the courts justify those decisions primarily on analytical 
grounds or institutional grounds. 
Even if one sticks to a narrow, strictly Sagerian concept of 
“underenforcement,”150 there is evidence that the Second Amendment 
remains judicially underenforced after Heller.  Lower federal courts have 
indeed continued to offer what Sager would recognize as frankly 
institutional, rather than analytical, rationales for adopting narrow views of 
Second Amendment rights.151  In a 2011 case, the Fourth Circuit declared 
that “[t]here may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places 
beyond the home,” but declined to undertake that question as a matter “of 
simple caution,” asserting that “we have no idea what those places are, 
what the criteria for selecting them should be, what sliding scales of 
scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a number of other 
questions.”152  (That assertion was mistaken; there is a long American state 
court tradition of applying the right to bear arms for self-defense to 
restrictions on bearing handguns outside the home, and courts can draw on 
this tradition for guidance.153)  But the Fourth Circuit continued, “We do 
not wish to be even minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act 
of mayhem because in the peace of our judicial chambers we miscalculated 
as to Second Amendment rights.”154 
This reasoning is clearly institutional, not analytical.  It emphasizes the 
perceived difficulty of judicial line-drawing in applying the Second 
Amendment to bearing arms outside the home155 and seems to express an 
attitude that judges’ institutional position should make them especially 
reluctant to impose Second Amendment limits on legislative decisions.  
Other lower courts have expressed similar sentiments, seeming to shrink 
from elaborating on Second Amendment doctrine in conventional fashion, 
but instead adopting a presumption against further judicial recognition of 
the right in cases that are not factually indistinguishable from binding 
                                                                                                                
150 See Sager, supra note 135, at 1218–19 (“While there is no litmus test for distinguishing 
[underenforced constitutional] norms, there are indicia of underenforcement.  These include a disparity 
between the scope of a federal judicial construct and that of plausible understandings of the 
constitutional concept from which it derives, the presence in court opinions of frankly institutional 
explanations for setting particular limits to a federal judicial construct, and other anomalies.”). 
151 See id. at 1226 (describing how institutional concerns can result in decisions by the courts that 
“do[] not do full justice to the invoked constitutional concept”). 
152 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475–76 (4th Cir. 2011). 
153 See generally O’Shea, supra note 131 (explaining how the right to carry arms outside the 
home is rooted in longstanding tradition and state precedent). 
154 Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475. 
155 See id. (referring to the subject of applying the Second Amendment in places beyond the home 
“as a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree”). 
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precedent.156 
The tenor of the lower federal courts’ post-Heller orientation toward 
the Second Amendment can also be suggested by summarizing their 
holdings and reasoning in prominent cases. 
B.  Defining the Study Period and the Database 
The start date of the study period, June 26, 2008, is the date on which 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided Heller, rendering the individual right to 
keep and bear arms enforceable in all federal courts.  The right was not 
generally held applicable against state and local governments until the 
Court’s June 28, 2010 decision in McDonald, but some lower federal 
courts did entertain—often arguendo—Second Amendment challenges to 
state and local laws before McDonald.157  The end date of the study period, 
October 15, 2013, is largely an artifact of the timing of the Symposium at 
which the material in this Article was initially presented.  However, this 
date does have the merit of encapsulating the first half-decade (and a bit 
more) of the Second Amendment individual right’s career in the lower 
federal courts.   
With the help of research librarians and staff, I performed Westlaw 
searches to identify opinions in the lower federal courts issued during the 
main study period that addressed Second Amendment claims.   
The project began with a focus on President Obama’s judicial 
appointees, then broadened to encompass all lower court federal judges.  
First, in summer 2013, we performed a Westlaw Classic search for federal 
circuit and federal district court opinions issued between June 26, 2008 and 
June 2013 that included the phrase “Second Amendment.”  To this search 
we added a filter for each serving lower federal court judge appointed by 
President Obama for whom an authorship filter was available.   
We later broadened the search to encompass post-Heller Second 
Amendment decisions by lower federal court judges appointed by 
                                                                                                                
156 See Pizsczatoski v. Filko, 840 F. Supp. 2d 813, 829 (D.N.J. 2012) (“[T]his Court does not 
intend to place a burden on the government to endlessly litigate and justify every individual limitation 
on the right to carry a gun in any location for any purpose.  The risks associated with a judicial error in 
discouraging regulation of firearms carried in public are too great.”); Williams v. State, 10 A.3d 1167, 
1177 (Md. 2011) (failing to offer an interpretive argument for why the “right to bear arms” should not 
include carrying them outside the home, but stating, “[i]f the [U.S.] Supreme Court . . . meant its 
holding to extend beyond home possession, it will need to say so more plainly”); accord Masciandaro, 
638 F.3d at 475 (“[W]e think it prudent to await direction from the [U.S. Supreme] Court itself.”). 
157 E.g., Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[E]ven if we are wrong 
about [rejecting] incorporation, the [challenged] ordinance, which leaves law-abiding citizens free to 
possess guns, appears to be consistent with the ruling in Heller.”); Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (holding that Second Amendment right was fully incorporated against the states under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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presidents of all parties.  For this query, we used a WestlawNext search for 
all decisions within the study period that were designated under the West 
Key Number 406k102 (Constitutional, Statutory, and Regulatory 
Provisions), within the Topic of Weapons (406).  This yielded a database 
of 278 decisions.  After removing those opinions that, on inspection, did 
not involve Second Amendment claims, we had 205 lower court Second 
Amendment opinions.  Finally, we added 20 Second Amendment opinions 
that had been found by the original search and were not included in the 
results for the second search.  This yielded a final database of 225 
opinions. 
This database underlies the analysis and conclusions presented in this 
Part.  I first summarize the lower court decisions at a general level, then 
add a factor that proves significant: the party of the president that 
appointed a given lower court judge. 
The, in Part IV.G, I extend the analysis past the study period, offering 
a less formal discussion of important Second Amendment opinions issued 
by the lower federal courts after October 15, 2013.  I consider to what 
extent they are consistent with the trends identified in the main study.  
Finally, Part IV.H briefly discusses the lower courts’ record of enforcing 
statutory protections against gun registration, since these are also relevant 
to diagnosing slippery-slope risk. 
C.  Cases on the Right to Carry Handguns for Self-Defense 
Heller and McDonald recognized an individual “right to . . . bear arms 
for the purpose of self-defense.”158  By doing so, the decisions assimilated 
the Second Amendment to one of the major strands of right-to-arms 
jurisprudence in American tradition.159  One of the most strongly attested 
features of the right to bear arms for self-defense has been the carrying of 
handguns outside the home.  In nearly two centuries of state court 
jurisprudence, this issue has been repeatedly litigated, and American courts 
                                                                                                                
158 See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
159 See O’Shea, supra note 131, at 609–11 (explaining that Heller and McDonald not only held 
that self-defense is the core component of the right to bear arms, but also assimilated the Second 
Amendment right to state constitutional provisions protecting the right of citizens to bear arms “in the 
defense of themselves,” or of each citizen to bear arms “in defense of [him]self,” both of which have 
historically been interpreted to protect weapons carrying).  The other major strand of jurisprudence is 
that of the so-called “hybrid” right to arms, which protects a personal right to own militia-type 
firearms, but views the right to bear arms as focused primarily upon the civic purposes of deterring 
government tyranny.  See id. at 642–48, 65356 (canvassing sources and distinguishing the “defense-
based right” tradition in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century jurisprudence from the “hybrid right” 
tradition).  See generally Michael P. O’Shea, The Second Amendment Wild Card: The Persisting 
Relevance of the “Hybrid” Interpretation of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 81 TENN. L. REV. 597 
(2014) (providing a discussion of the hybrid right to arms and how it might apply to gun controversies 
today). 
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have frequently interpreted self-defense-based arms rights provisions in 
state constitutions as protecting the carrying of handguns and other 
common weapons.160  If the Supreme Court’s decision to ground the 
Second Amendment right in personal defense puts any type of 
contemporary gun restriction in constitutional jeopardy, then it should be 
state laws that forbid or substantially impair citizens’ ability to carry 
outside the home.  That ought to be a natural part of the “cash value” of 
Heller’s adoption of a personal defense-based conception of the right. 
Yet in the study period, most lower federal courts proved reluctant to 
enforce this aspect of the right.  Three federal courts of appeals held that 
the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense was not infringed by 
restrictive “may-issue” state laws that require a citizen to make an unusual 
showing of a heightened threat to obtain a license to carry a handgun 
outside her home.161  Such laws foreclose most citizens from having any 
lawful way to bear those arms in public places.  While the Supreme Court 
in Heller described the handgun as the “class of ‘arms’ that is 
overwhelmingly chosen by American society for th[e] lawful purpose” of 
self-defense,162 the Second Circuit emphatically quoted—twice—the words 
of a 1913 state court decision characterizing the handgun as “the handy, 
the usual and the favorite weapon of the turbulent criminal class.”163  The 
Second Circuit concluded its opinion by emphasizing the government’s 
“authority to extensively regulate handgun possession in public.”164 
During the study period, two federal district court decisions (later 
reversed on appeal) also rejected Second Amendment challenges to state 
laws that confined citizens to carrying only unloaded handguns for self-
                                                                                                                
160 O’Shea, supra note 131, at 589, 596–98. 
161 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 42930 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a New Jersey law 
requiring an applicant to demonstrate a “justifiable need,” which was defined as an “urgent necessity 
for self-protection,” in order to carry a handgun for self-defense was “presumptively lawful”), cert. 
denied sub nom. Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 882 
(4th Cir. 2013) (holding that a Maryland statute that required an applicant to satisfy a  “good-and-
substantial-reason requirement,” which did not include a simple desire for self-defense, in order to be 
issued a handgun permit was “reasonably adapted” to substantial government interests of public safety 
and preventing crime), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 
F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding a New York law that conditioned the issuance of a concealed 
handgun license on the applicant’s showing of “proper cause,” defined as a special need for self-
protection beyond that of the general population), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). 
162 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008); see also id. at 628–29 (describing 
handguns as “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home 
and family” (quoting Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
163 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 85, 99 n.23 (quoting People ex rel. Darling v. Warden, 139 N.Y.S. 277, 
285 (App. Div. 1913)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
164 Id. at 101. 
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defense.165  The courts offered the dismissive theory that debarring most 
citizens from loaded carry did not meaningfully burden their Second 
Amendment rights, since state law still allowed a citizen to carry an 
unloaded gun on her person, plus separate ammunition.166  These federal 
judges (themselves protected at the public expense by trained officers with 
fully loaded guns) deemed it adequately respectful of self-defense to 
compel a citizen to spend several seconds, using both hands, to load her 
handgun once a felonious assailant began attacking her. 
One federal district court, surveying the case law on the right to carry, 
appeared to acknowledge an unusual hesitancy of federal courts to act in 
this area, opining that the lower courts’ reluctance to enforce Second 
Amendment limits outside the home “says more about the courts than the 
Second Amendment.”167 
D.  Other Types of Gun Restrictions 
1.  Enforcement of Gun Restrictions 
The pattern is similar when we turn to other types of gun restrictions.  
In the post-Heller study period, lower federal courts upheld a range of 
restrictions as being consistent with the Second Amendment.   
a.  High Registration Fees 
Among the measures upheld was a New York City law requiring a 
$340 registration fee, paid every three years, to exercise the very 
constitutional right recognized in Heller—personal ownership of a 
handgun at home.168  This fee is roughly equivalent to a 100% tax on a 
quality used handgun.  In upholding this fee scheme, the Second Circuit 
expressed doubt that the fee even imposed a “substantial burden” on 
individuals’ right to keep arms, but added that if it did so, it was still 
constitutional.169 
b.  Severe Restrictions on Home Possession of Handguns.   
Another panel of the Second Circuit even refused to assume that the 
Second Amendment right to keep a handgun extends to the summer 
                                                                                                                
165 See Richards v. County of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1175 (E.D. Cal. 2011), rev’d sub nom. 
Richards v. Prieto, 560 Fed. App’x 681 (9th Cir. 2014); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 
2d 1106, 1117 (S.D. Cal. 2010), rev’d, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). 
166 Richards, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 1176; Peruta, 758 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. 
167 United States v. Weaver, No. 2:09-cr-00222, 2012 WL 727488, at *4 n.7 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 6, 
2012); see also id. (“Limiting this fundamental right to the home would be akin to limiting the 
protection of First Amendment freedom of speech to political speech or college campuses.”). 
168 Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 172 (2d Cir. 2013). 
169 See id. at 167–68 (expressing doubt that this fee amounted to anything more than a “marginal, 
incremental or even appreciable restraint” on Second Amendment rights). 
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residence of a person who has two residences.170  Moreover, a federal 
district judge held—in a decision that was reversed on appeal to the 
Seventh Circut—that there was no Second Amendment problem with a 
municipal law that simultaneously (1) required all handgun owners to 
obtain training at a gun range, and (2) prohibited gun ranges.171   Federal 
laws received similar treatment.  The Fifth Circuit upheld a federal law 
prohibiting otherwise law-abiding eighteen- to twenty-year olds from 
buying a handgun at retail, despite considerable evidence that Founding 
Era sources considered eighteen- to twenty-year olds—who can vote, 
marry, sign contracts, join the military, and be drafted—to be adults and 
potential members of the militia.172  A federal provision that imposes a 
retroactive, lifetime ban on exercising the right to keep and bear arms, 
premised on a single misdemeanor conviction for domestic violence, has 
also been upheld.173  
c.  Rifle Bans  
A ban of the AR-15, the best-selling kind of rifle in America, along 
with a wide range of other semi-automatic rifles in common use, was also 
deemed permissible.174  The D.C. Circuit’s decision rested in part on the 
district court’s decision to defer to a legislative committee’s conclusion 
that these rifles were “‘military-style’ weapons designed for offensive 
use”175—even though, like countless other jurisdictions, the District of 
Columbia employed AR-15 rifles as standard equipment for its civilian 
police force, describing them more innocuously as “patrol rifles” in that 
context.176  And once again, the federal court’s opinion ranged further than 
necessary, musing that even a ban on all semi-automatic pistols (which 
comprise the large majority of all handguns sold in America today) might 
                                                                                                                
170 Osterweil v. Bartlett, 706 F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 2013). 
171 Ezell v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 5135, 2010 WL 3998104, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2010), 
rev’d, 651 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2011).  
172 NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 188, 212 (5th Cir. 
2012), reh’g denied, 714 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 2013).  But see NRA, 714 F.3d at 335 (Jones, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that § 922(b)(1) violates the Second Amendment rights of 
eighteen- to twenty-year-old adults). 
173 E.g., United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 26 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. White, 593 
F.3d 1199, 1200, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010).  But see United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 644–45 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc) (upholding the statute facially, and as applied against recidivist misdemeanant, but 
reserving the issue of whether as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(9) by “a 
misdemeanant who has been law-abiding for an extended period” might have merit); Gowder v. City of 
Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117, 1126 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (holding that municipal ordinance barring 
any “nonviolent” misdemeanant from gun ownership facially violated the Second Amendment). 
174 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
175 Id. 
176 See D.C. METRO. POLICE DEP’T, GENERAL ORDER GO-RAR-901.01, HANDLING OF SERVICE 
WEAPONS 3 (2008) (adopting the Colt AR-15A3 as the standard “patrol rifle” for District of Columbia 
police). 
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not violate the Second Amendment.177 
2.  Enforcement of the Second Amendment 
Despite the general post-Heller trend of strong deference, some cases 
in the study period reached merits dispositions that held government action 
violative of the Second Amendment.  Moreover, the generally deferential 
trend was met with a number of strong dissenting opinions. 
a.  Bans on Handgun Carrying   
The Seventh Circuit invalidated a state’s complete ban on handgun 
carrying (a decision echoed by that state’s supreme court).178  In a related 
vein, one federal district court struck down a statewide ban on possessing 
firearms outside the home or purchasing firearms during a declared state of 
emergency,179 while another found unconstitutional, as applied, a federal 
regulation prohibiting the presence of otherwise lawfully possessed guns in 
a post office parking lot.180  One federal judge also held that Maryland’s 
restrictive “may-issue” handgun carry permit law violated the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms,181 but this ruling was overturned on 
appeal.182   
b.  Restrictions on Gun Possession 
The Seventh Circuit granted a preliminary injunction blocking a 
citywide ban on gun ranges when the city simultaneously required gun 
                                                                                                                
177 See Heller, 670 F.3d at 1267–68 (“The dissent . . . insists it is ‘implausible’ to read Heller as 
‘protect[ing] handguns that are revolvers but not handguns that are semi-automatic.’  We do not, 
however, hold possession of semi-automatic handguns is outside the protection of the Second 
Amendment.  We simply do not read Heller as foreclosing every ban on every possible sub-class of 
handguns or, for that matter, a ban on a sub-class of rifles.” (quoting id. at 1289 n.16 (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting))).  But see id. at 1289 n.16 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“I find that an utterly implausible 
reading of Heller given the [U.S. Supreme] Court’s many blanket references to handguns and given 
that most handguns are semi-automatic.”). 
178 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012); see also People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 
321, 328 (Ill. 2013) (agreeing with the analysis in Moore and likewise holding unconstitutional the 
Illinois ban on carrying handguns in public). 
179 Bateman v. Perdue, 881 F. Supp. 2d 709, 711 (E.D.N.C. 2012). 
180 Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 10-CV-02408-RPM, 2013 WL 3448130, at *4, *6 (D. Colo. 
July 9, 2013).  The court upheld a prohibition of guns in the post office building itself.  Id. at *6. 
181 Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 47980 (D. Md. 2012), rev’d, Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).  The district court in Woollard rightly rejected Maryland’s 
argument that its restrictive approach to issuing handgun licenses was justified by a desire to 
“minimiz[e] the proliferation of handguns among those who do not have a demonstrated need for 
them.”  Id. at 475.  The court concluded that accepting such a broadly defined governmental interest as 
legitimate would negate the existence of the right to bear arms itself: “A law that burdens the exercise 
of an enumerated constitutional right by simply making that right more difficult to exercise cannot be 
considered ‘reasonably adapted’ to a government interest, no matter how substantial that interest may 
be.”  Id.  
182 Gallagher, 712 F.3d at 88283. 
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range training in order to legally own a handgun.183  Federal district court 
decisions granted relief from a law prohibiting nonviolent misdemeanants 
from owning a handgun,184 and a law banning all legal resident aliens from 
handgun ownership.185 
c.  Dissenting Votes to Grant Relief on Second Amendment 
Grounds 
Finally, there have been a few federal circuit cases in which a majority 
of the court rejected the Second Amendment claim at issue, but one or 
more dissenting judges would have held that the Second Amendment was 
violated by a particular regulation.  Thus, these dissenting votes also 
deserve to be counted as votes for relief on the merits on Second 
Amendment grounds.  Such votes were cast to overturn a prohibition on 
modern semi-automatic rifles,186 to overturn a restrictive “may-issue” 
handgun permitting law,187 and in dissent from a refusal to rehear an en 
banc decision upholding a federal ban on retail handgun purchases by 
eighteen- to twenty-year-old adults.188 
 
* * * 
 
The data suggests a general pattern of strong judicial deference to 
legislation, even when legislatures choose to enact restrictions that 
significantly restrict the ownership and use of firearms.  This pattern is 
interspersed with occasional decisions invalidating very restrictive laws, 
typically those that approximate total bans on possession or carrying of 
weapons.   
In Heller, the Supreme Court indicated that Second Amendment 
claims should receive a form of heightened scrutiny.189  Taken as a whole, 
the case law in the study period is consistent with the position that Second 
Amendment claims in the lower federal courts have generally received “a 
deferential, reasonableness review under which nearly all gun control laws 
would survive judicial scrutiny.’’190  At face value, it might be argued that 
                                                                                                                
183 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 690 (7th Cir. 2011). 
184 Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117, 1126 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
185 Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287, 303 (D. Mass. 2012). 
186 Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting). 
187 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 440, 443, 44658 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
188 NRA v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 714 F.3d 334, 335 (5th Cir. 
2013) (Jones, J., joined by five other judges, dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
189 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 & n.27 (2008) (rejecting rational basis 
review of Second Amendment claims while holding that a handgun ban would violate “any of the 
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights”). 
190 Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 686 (2007) 
Professor Winkler argues that this standard characterizes the jurisprudence of state courts applying state 
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this low level of enforcement could nevertheless suffice to protect the right 
against truly severe ‘‘slippery slope’’ scenarios involving prohibition,191 
although the long-term efficacy of such protection is questionable.192 
E.  The Political Variable: Judicial Enforcement of the Second Amendment 
by Party of Appointing President 
This picture deepens, and further details emerge, when we add one 
more variable to the data: the political party of the president that nominated 
each judge.  This variable reveals a profound partisan divide.  In the 
studied database of opinions, encompassing over five years since Heller, 
the use of the Second Amendment in the lower federal courts to impose 
limits on governmental action was carried out entirely by judges appointed 
by a Republican president, with a solitary (rather ambiguous) exception.193  
In every opinion described above that found a Second Amendment 
violation, every vote in favor of relief on the merits from government 
action—whether in a majority opinion, a dissent, or a dissent from denial 
of rehearing—was cast by a Republican-appointed judge. 
President Obama’s judicial nominees had a uniform record in the 
Second Amendment cases in the database.  Obama-appointed judges began 
assuming the federal bench in 2009, and issued or joined over dozens of 
opinions during the study period in cases addressing Second Amendment 
claims.  None voted to grant relief on any Second Amendment claim.194  
                                                                                                                
constitutional right to arms guarantees in the years since World War II.  Id. at 687.  It should be noted 
that many state courts in earlier periods applied significantly more stringent forms of review to the right 
to arms.  O’Shea, supra note 131, at 623–32.  Moreover, even in the period Winkler discusses, a 
significant number of state courts actually applied an analytically distinct standard, asking instead 
whether gun control laws “frustrated” the exercise of the right to arms—a standard that even an 
otherwise ostensibly “reasonable” law could fail.  Cf. Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear 
Arms, 89 IND. L.J. 1587, 1590 n.13 (2014) (presenting state cases employing the “frustration” 
standard). 
191 Cf. Winkler, supra note 190, at 722–26 (discussing “total prohibitions” and other extreme laws 
that violate the deferential type of “reasonableness” review). 
192 It is doubtful that the limited scope of firearms-related activity that is judicially protected by a 
reasonableness review would be enough to sustain a culture of legitimate gun ownership strong enough 
to prevent the right’s eventual abrogation.  See Olson & Kopel, supra note 16, at 421 (“Reducing the 
number of people who will, one day in the future, care about exercising a particular right is a good way 
to ensure that, on that future day, new restrictions on the right will be politically easier to enact.”); 
Volokh, supra note 12, at 1116–17 (discussing how regulation can create “political power slippery 
slopes” by creating barriers to the exercise of a right that reduce the number of individuals who are 
motivated to defend it, and thus make future restrictions possible). 
193 For a discussion of the exception, which involved a judge who was a former Republican 
congressional staffer appointed by Democratic President Bill Clinton as part of a compromise deal, see 
see infra notes 20003 and accompanying text. 
194 I treated opinions as granting merits relief if they supported injunctive relief (including 
preliminary injunctive relief) or summary judgment on a Second Amendment claim, reversed a 
conviction or dismissed a criminal charge on the ground of a Second Amendment violation, or found a 
triable issue on a Second Amendment claim.  I did not count as “granting relief” opinions that held that 
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Admittedly, not all of these cases are equally probative of judicial attitudes 
toward the Second Amendment.  A fair number of them involved low-
probability claims such as convicted felons seeking relief from federal 
felon-in-possession convictions.195  Heller specifically discussed such laws 
and said that they were presumptively constitutional,196 so it is no surprise 
that lower federal courts have turned away challenges to them.  But as the 
previous discussion illustrates, many of the Second Amendment claims 
adjudicated during the study period dealt with challenges to laws that were 
not presumptively blessed by Heller and involved plausible extensions or 
applications of Heller’s reasoning, such as a right to carry a handgun in 
public or protection for other classes of common arms beyond handguns, 
such as semi-automatic rifles.  During Heller’s first half-decade, 
Democrat-appointed federal judges consistently rejected such claims. 
Findings of this sort are not unprecedented.  Previous studies of federal 
judges’ attitudes in other substantive areas of law have also identified 
differences in outcomes based on the party of the appointing president.197  
It is worth noting, however, that the fact that Democrat-appointed federal 
judges have taken an exceptionally narrow view of Second Amendment 
rights post-Heller does not imply that Republican-appointed federal judges 
have generally taken a broad view of those rights.198  To the contrary, 
                                                                                                                
a Second Amendment plaintiff had merely stated a claim for relief, such as opinions denying a motion 
to dismiss or opinions finding that a Second Amendment claimant had standing to sue. 
195 For examples rejecting Second Amendment challenges to convictions under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1), the principal federal felon-in-possession statute, see United States v. Kline, 494 Fed. App’x 
323, 325 (4th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (panel including two Obama-appointed circuit judges); United 
States v. Woodson, No. 09-117-LPS, 2013 WL 817071, at *4 (D. Del. Mar. 5, 2013); and United States 
v. Pulley, 2013 WL 453279, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2013). 
196 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 62627 (2008) (stating that nothing in the 
majority’s decision should be construed so as to cast doubt on established prohibitions against felons 
possessing firearms). 
197 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 24 (2006) (“From 1978 through 2004, Republican appointees cast 275 total votes 
[in cases involving affirmative action], with 129 or 47 percent, in favor of upholding an affirmative 
action program.  By contrast, Democratic appointees cast 208 votes, with 156, or 75 percent, in favor of 
upholding an affirmative action program.”)  Sunstein and his co-authors identified significant 
differences in voting outcomes among federal circuit judges based on party of appointing president in a 
variety of controversial areas of law, such as abortion, affirmative action, campaign finance, capital 
punishment, and several others.  Id. at 8–13, 19–45. 
198 The voting behavior of lower federal court judges in post-Heller Second Amendment cases is 
most similar (though of course not identical) to the behavior Professor Sunstein and his co-authors 
observed in post-Lopez federalism cases resolving enumerated powers challenges to federal laws 
enacted under the interstate commerce power.  See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(invalidating a previous version of the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act as exceeding congressional 
power under the Commerce Clause, marking the first time in almost sixty years that a federal statute 
had been invalidated on Commerce Clause grounds).  In each area, judges appointed by both parties 
reject claims at high rates, yet there is a significant difference by appointing party in the rates at which 
such claims are accepted.  See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 197, at 18, 50–51 (reporting a statistically 
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Republican appointees have authored many important opinions rejecting 
plausible Second Amendment claims or expressing skepticism about 
broadened Second Amendment rights.199  We can more correctly sum up 
the results of Second Amendment litigation in the lower federal courts 
during the first half-decade since Heller in this way: judges selected by 
Republican presidents occasionally held that government action violates 
the Second Amendment while judges selected by Democratic presidents 
essentially never did so. 
The lone exception to the partisan divide in Second Amendment cases 
during the study period ends up proving the rule with an amusing 
precision.  In United States v. Engstrum,200 a 2009 case involving the 
lifetime prohibition on gun ownership by domestic violence 
misdemeanants,201 a federal district court judge held that the defendant 
could be entitled to a jury instruction that he should not be convicted under 
the statute if the jury found that he did not pose a future risk of violence: 
otherwise, in the judge’s view, allowing conviction would impermissibly 
deprive him of his Second Amendment rights.202  The judge was appointed 
by President Bill Clinton—but was actually a former Republican 
                                                                                                                
significant difference from 1995 to 2004 where Republican appointees rejected Commerce Clause 
challenges 94% of the time but Democratic appointees did so 97% of the time).   
It is thus interesting, and somewhat surprising, that Sunstein and his co-authors nevertheless label 
the Commerce Clause as an area in which their hypothesis (that partisan effects would occur) was 
“rebutted,” id. at 48, evidently because of the low overall rate of acceptance of such claims, id. at 50.  It 
seems to me that the post-Heller Second Amendment cases illustrate that there can indeed be 
consequential differences between judges who occasionally uphold a particular type of claim and those 
who practically never do so—or, in the case of Obama appointees during the study period, never do so.  
These differences would seem particularly relevant in public law issues like the Second Amendment 
(or enumerated powers), where a single successful claim can have far-reaching consequences for 
statewide or indeed national legislation.  
199 See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (upholding 
New York’s restrictive handgun carry license issuing statute); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 
1244, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding handgun registration law and ban on popular rifles such as the 
AR-15 and common magazines holding more than ten rounds); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 
458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (expressing great reluctance to recognize Second Amendment rights outside 
the home); NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2009) (rejecting incorporation of 
Second Amendment against state and local governments), rev’d sub nom. McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); Richards v. County of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1175 (E.D. Cal. 
2011) (holding that county’s restrictive program of issuing permits to carry a loaded handgun for self-
defense would receive only “rational basis” scrutiny, because the ability to carry an unloaded handgun 
was sufficient to preserve individuals’ Second Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense), rev’d 
sub nom. Richards v. Prieto, No. 11-16255, 2014 WL 843532, at * 1 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 2014). 
200 No. 2:08-CR-430 TS, 2009 WL 1683285 (D. Utah June 15, 2009). 
201 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012). 
202 See Engstrum, 2009 WL 1683285, at *1, 3–4 (stating that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) passed strict 
scrutiny, but that its constitutionality could be rebutted if application was sought against an individual 
who posed no prospective risk of violence).  Securing the jury instruction would have required the 
defendant to present evidence at trial to support the claim that he posed no prospective risk of violence.  
Id. at *3. 
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congressional staffer whose appointment was part of a compromise offered 
to Republicans.203  Engstrum was swiftly reversed by the Tenth Circuit 
pursuant to a writ of mandamus,204 but one circuit judge, also a Clinton 
appointee, expressed sympathy with the district court’s approach and 
argued that the issue should have received full briefing.205   
What does this litigation record, enriched by the party-of-appointment 
variable, imply about slippery-slope concerns?  It suggests that gun rights 
supporters cannot even count on Second Amendment rights receiving the 
modest level of judicial enforcement that they now receive.  The 
proportion of federal judges appointed by Democratic presidents will 
increase in the remaining two years of the Obama Administration, and it 
may increase still more depending on the results of the 2016 elections.206  
Unless Second Amendment enforcement becomes a more “bipartisan” 
issue in the federal judiciary, the existence of judicial review deserves little 
weight in offsetting slippery-slope concerns. 
To be sure, many of the decisions listed above drew dissenting votes; a 
few were later overturned by higher courts.  And some decisions have 
upheld Second Amendment claims.  One certainly need not think that the 
decisions rejecting plausible Second Amendment arguments were all 
wrongly decided.  Moreover, one need not single out any particular judge 
from this list or conclude that the judge concerned was not pursuing his or 
her best lights in respect to the Second Amendment.  It is enough to focus 
                                                                                                                
203 See Sam Fulwood III, Clinton Calls on Senate to Confirm Judicial Nominees, L.A. TIMES 
(Aug. 10, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/aug/10/news/mn-64301 (noting that Republican 
Senator Orrin Hatch obtained Stewart’s nomination as part of a compromise offered by the Clinton 
Administration); Judge Ted Stewart, U.S. DISTRICT CT., DISTRICT UTAH, 
http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/judges/stewart.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (stating that Judge Stewart 
served as Congressman Jim Hansen’s (R-Utah) Chief of Staff). 
204 In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009). 
205 Id. at 1195 (Murphy, J., dissenting from order granting petition for writ of mandamus); see 
also Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Murphy, Michael R, FED. JUD. CENTER 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=1725&cid=999& ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014) (noting that Judge Murphy was nominated by President Clinton).  In one other opinion in the 
database, a panel that included one Clinton-appointed judge joined a disposition that came fairly close 
to finding a Second Amendment violation.  In United States v. Rehlander, the First Circuit reasoned 
that the canon of constitutional avoidance counseled it to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) narrowly, 
which prohibits gun possession by persons “committed to a mental institution.”  666 F.3d 45, 46–47 
(1st Cir. 2012).  The court held that a temporary emergency hospitalization that required only ex parte 
procedures was not encompassed by the statute.  Id. at 47.  Otherwise, a serious question concerning 
due process violations would arise.  Id. at 48–50.  The court’s reasoning was informed by the 
recognition of an individual right to arms in Heller.  See id. at 48 (“Heller now adds a constitutional 
component.”).  
206 In recent interviews, Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg expressed her continued 
disagreement with the Heller decision and predicted that a Democratic President will be elected in 
2016.  Chasmar, supra note 140; Ginsburg Draws Connection Between Immigration Reform, Fair Pay 
for Women, TAKEAWAY, PRI (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-09-18/ginsburg-draws-
connection-between-immigration-reform-fair-pay-women. 
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on the overall effect and tenor of the decisions, whatever their cause.  That 
tenor is deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile, to claims that the Second 
Amendment limits government action. 
F.  A Note on Recent Developments 
In this Section, I will briefly discuss some notable Second Amendment 
decisions from lower federal courts in the months following the study 
period and ask how well these more recent decisions conform to the 
patterns identified in the previous Sections. 
At the end of 2013, a federal district court invalidated the 
unprecedented seven-round ammunition limitation in the NY SAFE Act.207  
The authoring judge was a Republican appointee.208 
The most notable Second Amendment decision of 2014 so far has been 
Peruta v. County of San Diego,209 in which a divided panel of the Ninth 
Circuit struck down San Diego County’s restrictive “may-issue” 
implementation of California’s concealed carry permit statute.210  The 
majority held that the County’s policy, which specified that a typical 
citizen’s interest in self-defense was not a “good cause” justifying the 
granting of a permit, amounted to a “destruction” of the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense and was therefore 
unconstitutional.211  Peruta is the first decision by a federal court of 
appeals to strike down a “may-issue” carry permit requirement.212  The 
Peruta panel decision conforms to the ideological pattern discussed earlier: 
the two panel judges who voted to grant relief on Second Amendment 
grounds were both appointees of Republican presidents,213 while the 
                                                                                                                
207 N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d 349, 371–73 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). 
208 See Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Skretny, William M., FED. JUD. CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2205&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014) (noting that Chief Judge Skretny was appointed by President George H.W. Bush). 
209 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014). 
210 Id. at 1178–79. 
211 Id. at 1167–70. 
212 Decisions from the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits during the study period rejected Second 
Amendment challenges to restrictive “may-issue” state statutes.  See supra note 161 and accompanying 
text.  The Seventh Circuit in Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), held that the Second 
Amendment was violated by Illinois’s handgun carrying statute, but this was a “no issue” statute 
banning all handgun carry, not a “may-issue” statute authorizing issuance of a permit in limited 
circumstances.  The federal district court in Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462 (D. Md. 2012), 
held that Maryland’s “may-issue” statute violated the Second Amendment, but this decision was 
reversed on appeal.  Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).  
213 Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain, a Ronald Reagan appointee, wrote the majority opinion, joined 
by George W. Bush appointee Judge Consuelo Callahan.  See The Judges of This Court in Order of 
Seniority, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view_seniority
_list.php?pk_id=0000000035 (last updated Apr. 2014) (listing appointing president of each judge).   
 1426 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1381 
dissenting judge, who found no constitutional violation,214 was a 
Democratic appointee.215  As this Article goes to publication, the judgment 
in Peruta is stayed and petitions for rehearing by the en banc Ninth Circuit 
are pending.216 
And yet, in recent months, three federal district court decisions have 
deviated from the party-of-appointment pattern identified in the main 
study.  In January 2014, a district court struck down Chicago’s post-
McDonald ban on the sale and transfer of firearms as a Second 
Amendment violation.217  This marked the first time that an Obama-
appointed judge found that government action violated the Second 
Amendment.218  In the same month, a district court judge appointed by 
President Clinton219 protected Second Amendment rights outside of one’s 
primary residence by entering a preliminary injunction against the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers’s ban on possessing firearms and ammunition on 
Corps property.220  Finally, another Clinton-appointed district court 
judge221 held that a municipal authority’s denial of a state-required permit 
to purchase a handgun violated a citizen’s Second Amendment right when 
                                                                                                                
214 See Peruta, 744 F.3d at 1179–99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Judge Thomas’s dissent rested, in 
part, on a historical argument that the concealed carrying of firearms was categorically excluded from 
the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections.  Id. at 1182–91.  This position leaves open the 
question of whether the open carrying of handguns outside the home (such as in a visible holster) may 
be entitled to some constitutional protection.  Cf. Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller 
and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1510–22 (2014) (examining 
early nineteenth-century sources and arguing that a proper application of Heller’s originalist method to 
the question of carry rights implies an individual Second Amendment right to carry weapons outside 
the home—but a right that is exclusively limited to open carry). 
215 See The Judges of This Court in Order of Seniority, supra note 213 (noting that Judge Sidney 
R. Thomas was appointed by President Clinton). 
216 Order, Peruta v. County of San Diego, No. 10-56971 (9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2014), available at 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/03/03/10-56971_order.pdf; Motion of the State of 
California to Intervene and Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Peruta v. County of San Diego, No. 10-
56971 (9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2014), available at http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/02/28/1
0-56971_motion_to_intervene.pdf. 
217 See Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 936–40, 946–47 (N.D. 
Ill. 2014) (applying a high level of scrutiny close to strict scrutiny to the city’s ban on gun sales and 
transfers because it substantially burdened the exercise of the right to possess arms). 
218 Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Chang, Edmond E-Min, FED. JUD. CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2133&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014). 
219 Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Winmill, B. Lynn, FED. JUD. CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2617&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014). 
220 See Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1085–86 (D. Idaho 2014) 
(applying strict scrutiny to the Corps’s ban on firearms as it applied to a citizen’s possession of a 
firearm for self-defense in his or her tent). 
221 Biographical Directory of Federal Judges: Stearns, Richard Gaylore, FED. JUD. CENTER, 
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2278&cid=999&ctype=na&instate=na (last visited Apr. 15, 
2014). 
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the denial was premised solely on a decades-old misdemeanor marijuana 
conviction.222   
These recent decisions, while few in number, are notable because they 
are decisions by Democratic appointees that reflect a willingness to block 
highly restrictive gun legislation.  Thus, they tend to mitigate one of the 
chief lessons of the main study: that Second Amendment enforcement 
since Heller has been conducted, essentially without exception, by judges 
appointed by presidents belonging to only one of the two major political 
parties.  If Second Amendment enforcement by the federal courts is indeed 
becoming a more “bipartisan” issue (particularly if such a shift migrates to 
the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court), then it will deserve more 
weight in gun policy debates as a mechanism that tends to mitigate slippery 
slope concerns. 
G.  A Note on Statutory Protections of Gun Rights 
I will also say a few words about judicial attitudes toward statutory 
protections of gun rights, since these also influence the plausibility of 
slippery slopes.  Someone might accept the conclusion that federal judges 
have proven strikingly reluctant to impose Second Amendment limitations 
on government action, yet respond that one could still foreclose slippery 
slope concerns about expanded recordkeeping legislation, by embedding 
statutory protections against abuse in the legislation itself. 
This is not implausible, and Manchin-Toomey itself contained 
provisions meant to function as statutory safeguards of just this sort.  It 
provided: “The Attorney General may not consolidate or centralize the 
records of the acquisition or disposition of firearms . . . maintained by . . . 
[a FFL or] an unlicensed transferor.”223  Unfortunately, these anti-registry 
provisions were poorly drafted in ways that would have reduced the 
protections offered by the measure and perhaps also weakened previously 
existing protections.224  
From a broader standpoint, the lower courts’ track record of enforcing 
                                                                                                                
222 Wesson v. Town of Salisbury, No. 13-10469-RGS, 2014 WL 1509562, at *4 (D. Mass. Apr. 
18, 2014). 
223 S. Amend. 711 to S. 649, § 122, 113th Cong. (2013). 
224 David Kopel has analyzed the intended anti-registry provisions of Manchin-Toomey in detail 
and identified several serious drafting problems that would have greatly reduced its protections.  As 
relevant here, the most important were: (1) Manchin-Toomey’s new language prohibiting the Attorney 
General from maintaining a registry would create a strong expression unius argument, not available 
under current law, that other federal agencies are not subject to the existing anti-registry provisions; 
and (2) the proposed new language specifically prohibited the Attorney General from consolidating or 
centralizing purchase records, thereby implying that other forms of data gathering and recordkeeping 
by officials might not violate the anti-registry prohibitions.  David B. Kopel, The Problems of Toomey-
Manchin, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/345845/proble
ms-toomey-manchin. 
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statutory protections of gun rights displays similar problems to the 
treatment of constitutional claims.  In NRA v. Reno,225 the leading case 
interpreting the scope of the Brady Act’s anti-registry provisions, the D.C. 
Circuit upheld a lenient approach to the prohibitions.226 The statutory 
language required federal officials to “destroy” the records of transactions 
that had been approved following a background check.227  However, an 
ATF regulation allowed information about the identity of persons who 
were subjected to a background check to be retained for up to six months’ 
time, ostensibly for the purpose of internal auditing of the National Instant 
Check System (“NICS”).228  A dissenting judge described the Agency’s 
view—that a statute commanding it to “destroy” records also authorized it 
to retain them for six months—as “reminiscent of a petulant child pulling 
her sister’s hair.  Her mother tells her, ‘Don’t pull the baby’s hair.’  The 
child says, ‘All right, Mama,’ but again pulls the infant’s hair.  Her defense 
is, ‘Mama, you didn’t say I had to stop right now.’”229  Yet the agency’s 
interpretation was upheld by a majority of the D.C. Circuit panel pursuant 
to the Chevron doctrine.230 
Similarly, another provision of the federal Gun Control Act creates a 
narrow exception to the Act’s decision to decentralize records of gun 
transactions by keeping them in the hands of FFLs rather than the federal 
government.231  The Act requires FFLs to notify the ATF when an 
individual attempts to purchase two or more “pistols[] or revolvers” in a 
single purchase or within a five-business-day period.232  The entire 
structure and context of the statute suggests that this exception’s textual 
limitation to reports of multiple sales of handguns is a material aspect of 
the legislative compromise embodied by the statute, and that the limitation 
should accordingly be enforced by courts.  The Gun Control Act contains 
many provisions that regulate handguns separately from long guns, such as 
rifles and shotguns.233  Moreover, the anti-registration provisions in the Act 
disclaim “any system of registration” of firearms,234 implying that any 
provision that requires the generation of additional information on firearm 
purchases should be construed narrowly. 
                                                                                                                
225 216 F.3d 122 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
226 Id. at 138.  
227 Id. at 128 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(2)(C) (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
228 Id. at 126. 
229 Id. at 142 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
230 Id. at 138 (majority opinion). 
231 18 U.S.C. § 923(g)(3)(A) (2012). 
232 Id. 
233 See, e.g., id. § 922(x) (imposing extensive restrictions on possession by juveniles of a 
“handgun” and “ammunition that is suitable for use only in a handgun,” but not of other common 
firearms or their ammunition). 
234 Id. § 926(a). 
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But again, the lower federal courts have failed to take statutory limits 
on gun regulation seriously.  In 2010, the Obama Administration 
unilaterally imposed an additional requirement on FFLs in states along the 
southern U.S. border to report all sales of two or more of certain semi-
automatic rifles235—and the requirement has been promptly upheld by 
lower federal court judges against a challenge that it was ultra vires.236  The 
courts also adopted a broad view of ATF’s authority to use “demand 
letters” to obtain a wide range of information about firearms transactions 
from FFLs, and rejected arguments that this activity contravened the 
statutory anti-registry provisions in the Gun Control Act.237 
The pattern of lower federal court holdings has a corrosive effect on 
efforts to shape legislative compromises on firearms regulation.  Consistent 
with the constitutional case law, government authority is regularly 
construed broadly and statutory protections against government action 
regularly prove to be worth less in practice than they appear on the page.  
This will lead rational gun rights supporters to increasingly discount the 
value of statutory rights as well as protections in staving off slippery 
slopes.  They will increasingly value protections that work simply by 
keeping information from coming into existence in the first place, and thus 
do not depend on cooperation from judges or the executive branch in order 
to function. 
V.  A COMPROMISE:  SEPARATING BACKGROUND 
CHECKS FROM FEDERAL RECORDKEEPING, WHILE 
AFFIRMING THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS FOR SELF-DEFENSE 
Some will conclude that the current judicial and legislative climate—
and the skepticism it may foster in congressional Second Amendment 
supporters—preclude a consensus on additional federal firearms 
regulation.  I take this view seriously.  However, I wish to conclude by 
examining a possible approach to background check legislation that is far 
more responsive than Manchin-Toomey to the dangers that such 
regulations pose to gun rights, and discussing how it might form part of a 
genuine compromise.  While the proposal has potential problems that raise 
concern—particularly about data security and implementation—it is worth 
study as a serious attempt to detach the idea of background checks for gun 
                                                                                                                
235 Application and Permit for Importation of Firearms, Ammunition, and Implements of War, 75 
Fed. Reg. 79,020, 79,021 (Dec. 17, 2010). 
236 Ron Peterson Firearms, LLC v. Jones, Nos. 12-2054, 13-2055, 2014 WL 3703825, at *4 (10th 
Cir. July 28, 2014); Nat’l Shooting Sports Found., Inc. v. Jones, 840 F. Supp. 2d 310, 323 (D.D.C. 
2012), aff’d, 716 F.3d 200 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
237 See, e.g., Blaustein & Reich, Inc. v. Buckles, 365 F.3d 281, 291–92 (4th Cir. 2004) (applying 
an arbitrary and capricious standard of review to the ATF’s decision to issue demand letters, thus 
giving the agency wide leeway in deciding when to issue such demands). 
 1430 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1381 
acquisition from the more controversial idea of registration and 
recordkeeping of the results of those checks.  Enforcing this separation 
should be central to any future effort to craft compromise legislation. 
A.  Easing the Slope (I):  A More Rights-Protective Approach to 
“Background Checks” for Private Sales 
During the Senate’s consideration of Manchin-Toomey, Senator Tom 
Coburn introduced his own background checks proposal, Amendment 
727,238 which I will call the Coburn proposal.  It was tabled without debate 
and received little national discussion.  Yet Coburn’s proposal is worth 
consideration, even by those who rejected Manchin-Toomey.  It differed 
from Manchin-Toomey in numerous respects that reflect a clearer appraisal 
of the risks created by federal background check legislation. 
The centerpiece of the Coburn proposal was the creation of a 
“consumer portal” that would allow individuals wishing to buy firearms 
from a private seller to use a computer to perform an NICS check upon 
themselves.239  Upon passing the check, the individual could print out a 
certificate showing his or her approval, which would be good for thirty 
days from the date the check was performed.240  Then, to purchase a 
firearm from a private seller, the individual would be required to provide 
the seller with a copy of a valid certificate of the NICS check performed on 
the consumer portal.241  The seller would be free to retain a copy of this 
document (and the proposal called upon ATF to promulgate an optional 
sample bookkeeping form that sellers could use to record the disposition of 
their firearms), but would not be required to retain any such copy.242 As an 
alternative to the certificate, the buyer in a private sale could also simply 
show the seller a currently valid, state-issued handgun carrying permit.243  
Private sales of firearms to a buyer who had not presented a valid NICS 
portal certificate or a valid state handgun carry permit would be 
criminal.244 
Thus, under the Coburn proposal, every private sale of firearms would 
be required to take place in the shadow of an official background check.  
But while an official record that a particular individual conducted an NICS 
self-check would remain, this record would not be tied to a particular 
                                                                                                                
238 S. Amend. 727 to S. 649, 113th Cong. (2013). 
239 Id. § 202(a)(4)(D)(3)(A). 
240 Id. § 202(a)(4)(D)(3)(B). 
241 Id. 
242 Id.  The proposal called upon ATF to promulgate an optional sample bookkeeping form that 
sellers could use to record the disposition of their firearms.  Id. § 202(a)(4)(D)(6). 
243 Id.  State handgun carry permits generally require extensive, fingerprint-based background 
checks.  E.g., Oklahoma Self-Defense Act, OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 21, § 1290.12 (West 2013). 
244 S. Amend. 727 to S. 649, § 202(c). 
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firearm, a particular seller, or even to the occurrence of a sale.245  
Similarly, an individual gun owner who has gone through the state-
supervised background checks associated with acquiring a handgun carry 
permit would not need to generate additional check records in order to 
acquire firearms from a private seller: the background check for the carry 
permit would stand in place of the portal check. 
In a sharp departure from the Manchin-Toomey proposal, private sales 
under the Coburn proposal would not generate any federal Form 4473s 
documenting the details of the transaction.246  Nor, under the Coburn 
proposal, would the individual seller in a private transaction be required to 
keep a record documenting the sale.  
These are important practical differences in the eyes of many gun 
rights advocates that would reduce, although not completely eliminate, the 
slippery slope risks created by more intrusive recordkeeping legislation.  
The Coburn proposal is what “background checks” for private sales look 
like after a genuine effort has been made to detach the checks from federal 
recordkeeping, especially the kind of detailed records on transactions 
whose abuse could easily create the functional equivalent of gun 
registration. 
The most important objections to the Coburn proposal are feasibility 
and technical concerns about security for the consumer portal.  Well-
documented problems with the federal government’s rollout of its web-
based enrollment portal for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act247 prompt skepticism about its ability to implement this new web-based 
regulatory program.  It would be particularly important to secure access to 
the consumer portal so that unauthorized persons could not run a check on 
others and learn potentially damaging information about whether a person 
is precluded from gun ownership under federal law.  These objections 
deserve to be taken seriously; the viability of the proposal I sketch here 
                                                                                                                
245 Many individuals would perform the self-check and print out the certificate, but not engage in 
a private purchase within the thirty-day period. 
246 As a reminder, Manchin-Toomey did generate such forms.  See supra text accompanying notes 
23–25.  It would have required them to remain in the inventory of a firearms retailer for twenty years, 
subject to ATF inspection, and be delivered to the federal government if the retailer went out of 
business. 
247 In Congressional testimony, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reported extensive 
failures of government officials to adequately oversee the development of the enrollment website for 
the new health care law.  See Healthcare.gov: Contract Planning and Oversight Practices Were 
Ineffective Given the Challenges and Risks: Testimony Before the Subcomm. On Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of William 
T. Woods, Director, Acquisition & Sourcing Management); see also Sam Baker, Obamacare Website 
Has Cost $840 Million, NAT’L J. (July 30, 2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/health-
care/obamacare-website-has-cost-840-million-20140730 (“[C]ost overruns went hand-in-hand with the 
management failures that led to the disastrous launch of HealthCare.gov and the 36 state insurance 
exchanges it serves.”). 
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depends on whether they can be answered.  In an age where numerous 
government records concerning gun ownership have been the subject of 
public leaks,248 such concerns are reasonable.  It would be valuable to hear 
informed commentary on the possible implementation of the Coburn 
Amendment from technically savvy privacy experts and scholars.  But if it 
can be shown as feasible, the Coburn proposal is more rights-protective 
than Manchin-Toomey and deserves to be preferred to it. 
B.   Easing the Slope (II):  Nationalizing “Shall-Issue” Defensive Handgun 
Carrying 
The Second Amendment protects a right to “carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”249  The most obvious application of this right is to liberalize 
restrictive laws governing the carrying of handguns for lawful self-defense.  
State court precedents spanning generations demonstrate that the carrying 
of handguns outside the home is basic conduct protected by the right to 
bear arms for self-defense.250 
At the same time, the right to bear arms for self-defense can be 
regulated in ways consistent with its exercise.  The Supreme Court has 
acknowledged this,251 and the state court tradition supports the 
conclusion.252  In the last three decades, a remarkable regulatory success 
story has gradually swept the nation: the spread and normalization of 
“shall-issue,” permit-based handgun carrying laws.253  “Shall-issue” 
denotes that all citizens who fulfill the training requirements are presumed 
entitled to receive the permit unless there is a specific reason for denial.254 
“Shall-issue” permitting laws reflect considerable regulation of the 
right.  The applicant must apply for and obtain a permit in order to carry.255 
He or she must pass a fingerprint-based background check.256  Applicants 
                                                                                                                
248 See Duane Lester, Comprehensive Timeline of Missouri’s CCW List Scandal, MO.               
TORCH (May 6, 2013), http://themissouritorch.com/blog/2013/05/06/complete-timeline-missouris-
ccwdepartment-revenue-scandal/ (detailing a leak of Missouri’s concealed carry weapons list to the 
ATF). 
249 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). 
250 See supra text accompanying note 160. 
251 Heller, 554 U.S. at 62527. 
252 See O’Shea, supra note 131, at 59798 (noting that courts have historically upheld restrictions 
on modes of carrying, such as prohibitions on concealed carry). 
253 See Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed 
Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 687707 (1995) (describing the passage of shall-issue 
carrying laws in more than a dozen states). 
254 See id. at 688 (providing an example of the relevant language that identifies nondiscretionary 
permitting regimes). 
255 Shall-Issue, May-Issue, No-Issue and Unrestricted States, BUCKEYE FIREARMS ASS’N, 
http://www.buckeyefirearms.org/shall-issue-may-issue-no-issue-and-unrestricted-states (last visited 
Mar. 5, 2014). 
256 Id. 
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must also generally receive training on gun safety and complete a live-fire 
marksmanship test.257  The permit must be kept on one’s person when 
carrying.258 
If the point of regulating the exercise of the right to bear arms is to 
insure that handgun carrying is done by peaceable citizens, then statistical 
evidence indicates that shall-issue laws are a conspicuous success.  Official 
data from numerous states indicates that shall-issue permit holders are 
unusually law-abiding compared to the population as a whole and do not 
commit a significant proportion of violent crimes committed with guns.259 
But if the meaning of “regulating” the exercise of the right to bear 
arms is really to render this constitutional right difficult or impossible to 
exercise in practice, then shall-issue laws are a conspicuous failure on that 
score.  A recent congressional study estimated the number of valid state-
issued handgun carry permits as approximately eight million at the end of 
2011.260 
So federal legislation extending the “shall-issue” regulatory regime to 
the holdout states would not be a repudiation of regulation.  Rather, it 
would be an eloquent affirmation that defensive handgun carrying is a 
basic expression of the constitutional right to bear arms, that this right 
exists in all fifty states, and that “regulation” is not a code word for 
obstructing and harassing the right’s exercise.  Such a recognition would 
go far toward assuaging concerns that the Second Amendment right 
recognized in Heller is not accepted as “ordinary constitutional law,” and 
that a significant political effort is underway to vitiate or even remove the 
right.261  As such, it would do a good deal—even in the current absence of 
strong Second Amendment enforcement by most lower federal courts—to 
alleviate the justified slippery-slope objections that arise to proposals to 
expand federal background check requirements. 
National concealed carry reciprocity is not an exotic suggestion.  In 
recent years, it has twice come within a handful of votes of obtaining a 
                                                                                                                
257 Id. 
258 E.g., Firearms/Concealed Handguns: Frequently Asked Questions, VA. ST. POLICE, 
http://www.vsp.state.va.us/Firearms.shtm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014). 
259 See David B. Kopel, Pretend “Gun-Free” School Zones: A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 515, 56469 (2009) (examining published rates of permit revocations in six “shall-issue” states 
and concluding that concealed carry permit holders are an unusually law abiding demographic 
compared to the adult population at large). 
260 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-12-717, GUN CONTROL: STATES’ LAWS AND 
REQUIREMENTS FOR CONCEALED CARRY PERMITS VARY ACROSS THE NATION 1 (2012). 
261 See David Kopel, Sotomayor Targets Guns Now: Justice’s Dissent Contradicts Confirmation 
Testimony, WASH. TIMES, June 30, 2010, at B1 (noting that a number of Supreme Court Justices 
apparently do not consider Heller to be settled law and explaining how their records do not inspire 
confidence in gun owners). 
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filibuster proof majority in the Senate.262  It should be a part of any future 
effort to create compromise legislation expanding federal background 
checks.  A combination of a national reciprocity bill with a revamped 
background check statute modeled on the lines of the Coburn proposal, and 
not the failed Manchin-Toomey legislation, would merit both a 
presumption of good faith and consideration by Second Amendment 
supporters in Congress. 
                                                                                                                
262 See Dan Freedman & Harvey Rice, Cornyn Introduces Concealed-Carry Reciprocity Bill, 
HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics/us/article/Cornyn-
introduces-concealed-carry-reciprocity-bill-5132935.php#/0 (reporting that the proposal received fifty-
seven votes in the Senate when it was voted on in 2013); Ed O’Keefe & Tom Hamburger, Could 
National Reciprocity of Concealed-Carry Permits Kill the Gun Bill?, WASH. POST. (Apr. 12, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/could-national-reciprocity-of-concealed-carry-permits-kill-
the-gun-bill/2013/04/12/7cb4131a-a38d-11e2-9c03-6952ff305f35_story.html (reporting that the 
proposal received fifty-eight votes in the Senate when it was considered in 2009). 
